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NETWORK TELEVISION RATE PRACTICES: A CASE STUDY
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RECENT Federal Trade Commission proceedings have forcefully called at-
tention to the fact that the rate structures for the purchase of national net-
work television time discriminate strongly in favor of large advertisers and
against companies with smaller budgets.1 Further examination of network tele-
vision rates reveals that they also have substantial "tying" effects - that is,
they limit the freedom of advertisers who buy "prime" network time to allocate
the rest of their advertising budgets among other networks and media. Both
price discrimination and tying arrangements are likely to have important anti-
competitive effects either in the industry in which they are found or among
the customers of that industry. As a result of these effects, television rate struc-
tures may not only be at cross purposes with a central objective of the Federal
Communications Act - to achieve a television industry which best serves the
public interest - but may also be having an adverse effect on competition in
industries which rely heavily on television advertising.
Because of their possible anticompetitive effects, both price discrimination
and tying arrangements are generally subject to the most stringent standards
under the antitrust laws. Thus questions are posed whether the Federal Com-
munications Commission in guarding the public interest is exercising appro-
priate surveillance over this feature of network rate structures and whether
these rate structures involve violations of the antitrust laws.
The discriminatory and tying effects of network rate structures are masked
both by their own intricacy and by the complexity of the television industry.
This study will (1) briefly describe the structure of the television industry,
(2) examine in detail the network rate structure itself, (3) call attention to its
anticompetitive tendencies (a) within the industry and (b) in the economy as
a whole, (4) consider the applicability of the antitrust laws, and (5) examine
the authority of the Federal Communications Commission to deal with the
problem.
tProfessor of Law, Columbia University.
*Attorney, Federal Communications Commission. This article was prepared prior to
the author's association with the FCC and contains the independent views of the author.
1. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRA"E REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) U 16673
(FTC 1963) and General Foods Corp., 3 TADnE REG. EP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
1 17161 (FTC 1964). Each proceeding is discussed in Part III B of this study.
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF NETWORK TELEVISION
Licensed commercial television stations. There were, in 1963, some 581
commercial television stations licensed by the Federal Communications Com-
mission.2 These stations serve more than 50 million households - over 90 per
cent of the nation's total.
3
The typical television station is "on the air" for 15.5 hours a day.
4 FCC
regulations seem to require commercial television broadcast stations to remain
on the air on a year-round basis. The Commission does not place a maximum
on the number of hours a station may broadcast each day or week. However
it does have minima. Following a 36 month trial period the minimum require-
ment becomes two hours each broadcast day in each of the seven days of the
week and not less than 28 hours total.8 These requirements do not apply to
noncommercial educational broadcast facilities.
7
The Commission, however, has shown a willingness to change the minimum
requirements if they impose a financial burden on the licensee 8 and has re-
fused to give weight to promises of longer hours of operation in comparative
proceedings so long as the proposed schedule of operation is not "totally in-
adequate." 9
A broadcast station's success as a commercial venture depends on its ability
to fill its broadcast hours with attractive programming, and to sell the time to
advertisers. These two factors are interrelated; popular programming attracts
the large audiences sought by advertisers, and advertisers provide the funds
necessary for attractive programming.1" Stations obtain program material from
several sources: (1) A network supplies its affiliates with programs and com-
mercials for which it has contracted with national advertisers. The network
also provides its affiliates with a certain number of unsponsored or sustaining
2. 29 FCC ANN. REP. 80 (1963). Much of the information in this section is derived
from JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 14-28 (mimeo ed. 1964),
and the sources there indicated. Some of it is based on conversations with people in the
industry, to which there has been no attempt to cite.
3. TELvisioir FACTBOOK 38a (1964).
4. JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-29.
5. 47 C.F.R. § 73.651 (1965). Daily and weekly minima imply that a station must
remain on the air year-round.
6. 47 C.F.R. § 73.651(a) (1) (1965).
7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.651(b) (1965).
8. For an example of FCC relaxation of minimum hours for standard broadcast
licensees see 20 Pike and Fischer Radio Regulation [hereinafter cited as P.&F.R.R.] 1531
(FCC 1960).
9. Enterprise Co., 9 P.&F.R.R. 818u (FCC 1955) (balanced programming more im-
portant than hours of operation); Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 10 P.&F.R.R. 1224 (FCC 1955) ;
WORZ, Inc., 12 P.&F.R.R. 1157 (FCC 1957); Petersburg Television Corp., 10 P.&F.R.R,
567 (FCC 1954) (hours not a basis for preference although it reflects favorably on appli-
cant who proposed 24 hour programming) ; Sacramento Broadcasters, Inc., 10 P.&F.R.R.
615 (FCC 1955) (four hour per week difference not a basis for preference). See also NTA
Television Broadcasting Corp., 22 P.&F.R.R. 273 (FCC 1961) (educational television station
not disadvantaged in a comparative hearing because of refusal to operate on Saturday).
10. JONES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-29.
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shows which help provide program continuity. Networks also sell to affiliates
and independent stations rights to use films or tapes of network programs at
some date after their original presentation. News and public affairs programs
supplied by the networks are largely network produced. Most other network
programs are acquired from independent producers, typically on film; increas-
ingly the networks have taken a financial interest in such material." (2) In-
dependent producers supply program material. Some of the program mate-
rial is sold directly to stations which in turn sell sponsorship or participations
to advertisers. Most of the independently produced programming, however, is
sold to networks; some is sold to advertisers who offer it to the network or
the station.' 2 (3) Advertisers occasionally supply their own program material
to individual stations. In such situations, they purchase station time from na-
tional sales representatives employed by the stations.
National sales representatives also handle sales to national or regional ad-
vertisers of participations in programs the station has acquired from other
sources and "spots"' 3 before and after other programs. Most local advertisers
are handled directly by the station.14 Network affiliates usually derive the bulk
of their income from the sale of spot time between network programs, time
which is made valuable by adjacency to those programs.
UHF The amount of radio spectrum space which can be assigned to tele-
vision is limited and in turn the number of stations is limited.'3 But these
limitations are important only if television broadcasting is confined to the
11. House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Televsion Network Program
Procurement, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong, 1st Sess. 97, 98, Table 4-A at 124 (1963).
12. Id. at 120.
13. In the television industry the term "spot" has acquired several different although
overlapping meanings. Here the term refers to commercials which are not accompanied
by programming. This type of spot advertising is said to have less value than participa-
tions or sponsorship. It is a well known fact that television audiences decrease in size
in the between-program commercial break. This type of advertising also lacks sponsor
identification with a particular program. Another meaning of "spot" refers to all non-
network sales of station time. The national representatives who sell spot time usually
receive a percentage commission from the stations involved. In some cases they are re-
tained on a flat fee basis.
14. Most television stations maintain differential rates for local advertisers. Local
advertising rates are far lower than national advertising rates even though the time which
is sold is essentially of the same quality. One explanation for the differential has been
the double commission a station must pay for time sold nationally; a fifteen percent
advertising agency commission, and a fifteen to twenty percent national sales representative
commission. This differential is also present in the newspaper industry.
The double commission explanation is, however, not adequate since the cost of selling
is borne by the national advertising representative. Occasionally national advertisers at-
tempt to get local rates either through co-operative advertising schemes or by using their
market positions to demand the greater discount. See Now a Push for Guaranteed Circula-
tion, Broadcasting, October 8, 1962, p. 31 (Sealtest attempting to use market power to
purchase spot time at local rates and to get special continuity discounts).
15. House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Network Broadcasting, HR.
REp. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1958). Hereinafter cited as Nmvo, BoAD-
CASTINfG.
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relatively narrow Very High Frequency (VHF) band of the radio spectrum,
the first to have been fully developed technologically and to date the most im-
portant vehicle of commercial television. The Federal Communications Com-
mission has repeatedly recognized the impossibility of building an adequately
competitive television broadcast industry within the technical limitations of
VHF. Since the early 1950's, it has encouraged the development of the U-IlF
broadcast band, which includes 70 television channels and which permits the
assignment of twelve UHF channels in a single location without electrical
interference.'" Combined use of UHF and VHF would greatly increase the
number of television stations which could be licensed in an individual com-
munity and would bring about a commensurate increase in interstation com-
petition. It would also encourage the formation of additional television net-
works. Increasing the number of independent stations would make it easier
for advertisers to put together an independent "network" of stations in each
important market willing to accept the program. The quality and amount of
independent programming would be likely to increase because the cost could
be distributed over a greater number of stations.
Until recently UHF technology was not as advanced as VHF technology.1 7
UHF reception was inferior, the range of UHF stations was limited, and most
receivers were not equipped to receive UHF programming,18 At first the
Commission followed a policy of intermixture of UHF and VHF licenses.10
When that policy failed because of the competitive weakness of UHF, "de-
intermixture" became the policy.20 Communities were designated as either all
UHF or all VHF and the licenses in the communities were reassigned accord-
ingly.21 Later, the Commission asked Congress for the power to require set
manufacturers to produce receivers designed for "all channel" reception. Sub-
section (s) was added to section 303 of the Communications Act in 1962,'2
and under its authority the Commission ordered the production of "all-chan-
nel" receivers.2 3 New UHF licenses were granted in all-VHF communities."
16. Ibid. For a summary of the Commission's efforts to expand the use of UHF, see
Note, The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1578
(1962). See also Albany-Schenectady-Troy (the deintermixture case) 15 P.&F.R.R. 1501,
1511 (FCC 1957); Option Time, 34 FCC 1103 (1963).
17. NETwoRK BROADCASTING at 32; Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1578, 1596-97 (1962).
18. NarwoRu BROADCASTING at 32. See also TELEvIsIoN FAcraooIr 38a (1964) for
comparison of UHF and VHF set production.
19. Sixth Report and Order, 1 P.&F.R.R. 91601 (FCC 1952).
20. Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 P.&F.R.R. 1571 (FCC 1956).
21. The attempt at deintermixture was only partially carried out. See, e.g., Channel
Assignment in New Bedford, Mass., 21 P.&F.R.R. 1691 (FCC 1961) (deintermbiture of
Hartford, rejected with possibility of reconsideration; New Orleans Deintermixture case,
15 P.&F.R.R. 1603 (FCC 1957); see generally Note, 75 HADV. L. Rav. 1578, 1586-87
(1962).
22. 76 Stat. 150 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1962).
23. 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.65, 15.66 (1965).
24. The abandonment of deintermixture was a congressional condition for the passage
of the All-Channel Receiver Bill. See H.R. REP. No. 1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-26
(1962); S. RE. No. 1526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-19 (1962).
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Although UJHF technology is now substantially improved, to date UHF broad-
casters have not made much commercial headway. Network affiliation is typi-
cally available to them only where no VHF outlet covers the same market.25
The lack of network programming deprives them not only of the national ad-
vertising revenue that goes with it, but also of the large audiences which
stimulate spot time sales to both local and national advertisers. As will be
noted, some of the networks' rate policies have intensified these problems.
The networks. Network affiliation is highly prized by stations, and all but
a very few are affiliated with at least one of the three networks. Stations lack-
ing network affiliation are less profitable than affiliates and their failure rate
is higher.26 The networks select affiliates on the basis of their ability to provide
the widest possible coverage without substantial duplication. A typical affilia-
tion agreement, limited to a two year term,- provides that (1) the affiliate
will have first call in its community on all of the network's programs; (2)
the station's time will be sold to network advertisers at a specified "network
hourly rate" and the station will receive a percentage of that rate as compen-
sation;28 (3) the network will supply "sustaining" programs to the station,
live or on film; (4) the first five hours of network programming each week
are to be carried by the affiliate without compensation; (5) the network will
arrange for the interconnection of the station with the network and the delivery
of the program material.29
A network affiliate which is offered network programming and advertising
may refuse to carry or "dear" the program,30 may offer to dear it at a different
time, or may accept it. Despite the number of alternatives legally open to
affiliates, the networks obtain a high rate of station acceptance for their pro-
grams.3 '
25. 29 FCC ANN. REP. 69 (1963) ; NErwoPx BROADCASTING at 222.
26. Narwoax BROADCASTING at 207.
27. 47C.F.R. § 73.658(c) (1965).
28. The station is paid thirty percent of its "network rate" for programs past the
first five hours. This system of station compensation seriously complicates netwvork rate
structures because of the arbitrary distinction the networks draw betveen "rate" differ-
ences and "discounts." Station compensation is based on "rate," and "discounts" are
"absorbed" by the network.
Station owners are acutely aware of shifts in compensation caused by the netvork dis-
count systems and have battled with the networks to get a larger share of overall revenue.
See A Downswing in TV Compensation, Broadcasting, February 17, 1964, p. 46; A Bigger
Cut for Network Affiliates, Broadcasting, February 24, 1964, p. 56 (Station owners argue
that network owned stations receive a lion's share of the compensation).
29. Each network charges advertisers a "networking" or "network distribution charge"
in addition to its billing for time and program. The charge ranges from $3,600 per quarter
hour to $1,750 per hour depending on the time period and the network. It covers services
required for film or video tape origination, recorded repeat broadcast, transcontinental
cable, shipping to affiliates, and other distribution costs.
30. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(e) (1965).
31. See Application of Section 3.658(a) and (b), 24 P.&F.R.R. 513 (FCC 1962).
"Option time" clauses in affiliation contracts are now prohibited by FCC regulation.
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Most programs are today produced under contractual arrangements with
the networks. Program ideas may come from advertisers, advertising agencies,
independent writers or the producers themselves. If a network likes an idea,
it may advance money for the development of a script. If the script is accepted,
the producer may enlist the services of a production company to produce a
pilot film or films, again probably with network financing. By this point the
network is likely to have secured for itself the first and second network run,
as well as "syndication" rights which give it participation in both foreign and
domestic "off-network" distribution proceeds.3 2
The primary function of the networks, however, is as a sales agent, arranging
for the interconnection of television stations to provide simultaneous broadcast
of programs and commercials, selling time on the interconnected facilities to
national advertisers and arranging the sale of programming to advertisers to
fill the noncommercial segments of the time sold. Almost all network income
comes from these sales of time and programs. Major network expenses are the
cost of arranging the interconnection of affiliates, the cost of maintaining a
news and public affairs department, and the cost of administration. Payments
to affiliated stations are on a percentage basis. If the station is not sold to the
advertiser as part of the desired network it receives no compensation. 3 Pay-
ments to program sources are added to the advertiser's bill. Costs run high:
the program material for a full hour variety show typically costs about $150,-
000, and a half-hour horse-opera costs about $60,000, exclusive of network
time; u full network "prime" evening time runs in the range of $150,000 per
hour, computed by adding the "network hourly rates" of the individual stations
which carry the program and commercials. 3
Each network owns five VHF television stations, the maximum permitted by
FCC regulations.3" These outlets are all in the areas of greatest population
concentration; the five outlets of each network can reach about 25 per cent
of the nation's receivers.37 Their hourly network time rates are also the high-
est, averaging around $5,000 per hour.
"One-program networks." Occasionally advertisers form their own "net-
works" to carry programs which have been rejected by the three networks.m8
Before the regulation networks obtained contractual rights to the use of an affiliate's prime
time for network programs. Option Time, 34 FCC 1103 (1963). See discussion in text
infra at notes 258-64.
32. A. Mueller, The Network Role in Television Program Participation, J. SCeRnxn
PRODUCERS GUILD, Nov. 1964, p. 8.
33. See note 28 supra.
34. See HANDY GuIE TO THE ADVERTISING BUSINESS 14, (Advertising Publications,
Inc., 4th ed. 1964).
35. See, e.g., CBS Television Network Rate Card No. 16, effective June 15, 1963.
36. See Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 18 Fed. Reg. 7796, 9 P.&F.R.R.
1563 (FCC 1953) ; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
37. Option Time, 34 FCC 1103, 1125 (1963).
38. The networks have from time to time rejected high quality programming on tile
ground that it pulls down overall netvork ratings. Several large advertisers, most notably
1344 [Vol. 74:' 1339
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To avoid the cost of live interconnection the stations receive the programs in
advance of broadcast on film or videotape. In a very limited number of cases
interconnected networks are formed to carry live special features such as
sporting events, often of a regional nature. One serious limitation to the
development of "one-program networks" is the cost of cable facilities for live
interconnection. Under an "eight-hour" rule in the AT&T tariff schedule the
rental of cable facilities for less than eight hours of continuous use is very sub-
stantially higher than rental rates for equal facilities for a longer period.39
Another important limitation is that unless programming costs are distrib-
uted over a large number of stations they cannot be made competitive with
network program costs in relation to the number of receivers reached.40 Thus,
in addition to the relatively few independent stations which might be interested,
a certain number of affiliated stations must run the independent program in-
stead of clearing the network offering. As will be noted, the rate policies of
the networks tend to penalize and inhibit this kind of independent action.
41
Advertisers. More than 13 billion dollars were spent on all forms of advertis-
ing in 1963, about 16 per cent of which-some $2,062,000,000-mwas spent on
television programs and commercials, including time, program costs and ad-
vertising agency commissions.4 Purchases of network time are made by a rela-
the Xerox Corporation, have purchased time on independent stations to get the programs
on the air.
39. The average "hourly rate" under contract service for connecting New York and
Boston for one hour daily would amount to $1,075.62 as compared with a charge of
$7,018.50 per hour on an occasional use basis. The rates are such that a nehork broad-
casting less than two hours daily would incur as high a monthly service charge as a net-
work telecasting eight hours of consecutive programs. See NnrwoRK BnoADCAST nG at
201-02.
40. Broadcasting, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 52.
41. See discussion in text infra at notes 78-80.
42. The following tabulation indicates the source and recipients of the revenues:
Source
(millions)
Network time sales .............................. $ 521.5 (30.6%)
National and regional time sales ................ 539.5 (31.5%)
Local advertiser time sales ....................... 242.5 (142%)
Talent and programs ............................ 322.5 (18.95)
Sundry revenues ................................. 80.3 (4.7%)
1706.3
Participation in Revenue
Major networks (and stations) .................. 7542 (44.1%)
Other stations ................................... 732.0 (42.9%)
Representatives and agents ....................... 220.1 (13.0%)
1706.3
Joxxs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-34. See also 29 FCC ArN. REP. 85-89 (1963). Figures
do not include advertising agency commissions or the cost of advertiser-produced programs.
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tively small number of advertisers. In 1956, for example, only about 350 com-
panies purchased network time, the top fifty accounting for about 75 per cent
of the gross time charges.43 During the same year, 4,400 advertisers were in
the spot television market and the top fifty accounted for 45 per cent of gross
time billings. Since the list of the top 100 network advertisers partially dup-
licates the list of the top 100 spot advertisers it is safe to assume that fewer
than 100 advertisers are responsible for a major portion of all forms of tele-
vision advertising.
44
For the most part, users of network television make their purchases through
advertising agencies.45 Multi-product firms may employ several agencies, each
agency charged with servicing one or more products. The advertising agency
is responsible for developing a campaign strategy and a theme for the adver-
tising program. As a natural consequence of its role in preparing advertising
material, the agency usually plays a large role in developing an overall product
marketing plan. It decides where advertising should be placed, produces the
actual advertising material, sends insertion orders, checks on the proper in-
sertion and forwards a bill to its clients. In return for the agency's service the
networks pay a 15 per cent commission.4" Several agencies have recently
dropped the commission system and bill the advertiser directly for professional
services rendered.
In deciding on a specific advertising program for a product, the agency must
first select the "target market." Most frequently the market selected is a demo-
graphic one. Amounts are budgeted for advertising in newspapers, magazines,
network television, spot television, network radio, spot radio and outdoor dis-
plays. The amounts are then allocated to particular publications and broadcast
services. The most important single factor in media selection for mass pro-
duced consumer goods is the cost of placing a given commercial message before
a given number of potential customers. The estimate of this average cost for
television is based on viewer surveys. A television program with a high rating
is likely to be more "efficient" in that it will attract a larger number of viewers
per dollar outlay. Ten years ago the most desirable form of television advertis-
ing was thought to be the sponsored program - a single advertiser identified
his product with the program and made use of all the time for commercials
which it afforded. More recently, the theory has been accepted that full spon-
sorship of a single program resulted in circulation duplication: the same
viewers watched the program from beginning to end and the effectiveness of
the subsequent commercials was less than that of the first. This approach
43. JoNEs, op. cit. slupra note 2, at 14-33.
44. Ibid.
45. See generally DUNN, ADvERTISiNG, ITS ROLE IN MODERN MARKETING (1961);
KIRKPATRIcK, ADVERTISING, MASS COMMUNICATION IN MARKETING (1959); BRowN, LESS-
LER & WEILBACHER, ADVERTISING MEDIA (1957).
46. The commission system has historical roots in the advertising industry. It is
generally recognized as one of the anomalies of the industry, since the commission is paid
by the media, i.e., it is deducted from the bill submitted to the advertiser.
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argues that the most efficient advertising method is to scatter single minute
commercials through the entire evening schedule of the network with the high-
est overall rating. More recently still, network officials have predicted a svitch
back to full program sponsorship and the advantages of product identification
with a certain show.
47
I. TELEvIsIoN NEvwoc RATE AND DISCOUNT STRUCTURES
With striking uniformity all advertising media offer volume discounts. From
law reviews to Life Magazine, from the Ncw York Times to small-circulation
weeklies, from the Mutual Broadcasting System radio network to single small
radio stations, the advertiser who buys large quantities of time or space on a
regular basis pays a lower rate than his smaller competitor.48 Network tele-
vision, however, has developed the discount rate structure to its most sophis-
ticated level. Before examining the details of the discounts it will be useful to
look more carefully at the commodity to which they apply.
The television networks' basic commodities, network time and programming,
are sold both separately and in packaged units. When the advertiser contracts
separately for time and program, the program charge is based on cost and rat-
ing,49 and remains fixed regardless of the number and identity of stations used.
The price of network time is, in theory, based on the network rate cards. Pro-
gram price is subject to bargaining between advertiser and network; large ad-
vertisers may well be able to drive the best bargains.
If time and programming are sold as a package, advertisers pay a flat sum
for a "commercial minute."50 The purchase price includes all network charges.
"Package" deals are most common in the sale of expensive programs which
no advertiser cares to sponsor alone and in the sale of time left over at the
end of the selling period for the forthcoming season.
47. Information in the foregoing paragraph was derived largely from interviews
with television network sales executives, March and April, 1965.
48. A full page in the Columbia Law Review on a yearly (eight issue) basis is
$250; one half page in a single issue is $30. The New York Times general advertising
rate for a single insertion is $2.50 per agate line; the lowest retail advertising rate, avail-
able to users of 20,000 agate lines in one year, is $0.97 per agate line. On a 52 insertion
contract basis a single page in Time magazine costs $14,870; if purchased in half column
segments on a single insertion basis a full page would cost $19,020. See Columbia Law
Review Rate Card; New York Times General Rate Card No. 71, Nov. 5, 1964; and
New York Times Retail Store Advertising Rate Card, Nov. 10, 1964; Time Magazine
Rate Card No. 57, Jan. 1, 1965.
49. Television ratings purport to indicate the number of people watching a particular
television program. The ratings are based on studies of a small, select sample of viewers.
The rating company then projects the results of its study to get national figures. See
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Evaluation of the Statistical Methods
Used In Obtaining Broadcast Ratings, H.R. REP. No. 193, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
50. Under the National Association of Broadcasters' Good Practice Code, a netvork
is limited to six "commercial minutes" each hour during prime time. The term "commercial
minute" refers to the time and program cost for one-sixth of an hour. In non-prime time
the limitations are relaxed and network program segments are sold in fifteen minute
packages, each one carrying three commercials.
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When time and programming are sold separately under a sponsorship sys-
tern, the advertiser may tailor his purchase to meet his needs; he can bargain
for the day and hour of his program and for the stations which will carry
his message. The package system is less flexible in that advertisers must
accept the day, hour and station line-up selected by the network, and must
take their commercial minutes during the programs which the network has
decided to sell on a participation basis. The cost of participations in the case
of "left-over"5 1 time is usually the subject of hard bargaining between the net-
works and the advertisers through their agencies.
The basic rate structure for network time and the available discounts are
set out in rate cards published by each network.52 The rate cards apply only
to the separate sale of time for sponsored programs,5 3 and network time rates
are based on the applicable rates of participating stations. One hour of "prime"
or Class "A" time - between 6 and 11 - is the basic unit for price calcula-
tions. Time adjacent to prime time is priced at 50 per cent of the prime time
rate; daytime is priced at roughly one-third of the prime time rate.
The networks' rate structures immediately raise antitrust questions because
certain discounts seem to be analytically indistinguishable from practices tradi-
tionally regarded as anticompetitive. The most important such feature of the
rate structures of each of the television networks is that they give very sub-
stantial price discounts to advertisers whose dollar (or unit) volume of pur-
chase of network time during a year (or other period) is large. The systematic
price discrimination inherent in volume discounts 54 of this type, unless there
are cost considerations which fully justify the discriminatory treatment, are
thought usually to present a likelihood of injury to competition in two impor-
51. Some programs are sold at the outset as participation programs. At the end of
the selling season each network usually has a few shows which have not been sold. These
are packaged and sold at "bargain basement" prices.
52. The rate cards on which this study has been based are: ABC-TV Rate Card
No. 10, effective April 1, 1961 (a new rate card has been issued this year which is not
substantially different from the one used); CBS Television Network Rate Card No. 16,
effective June 15, 1963; and NBC Television Network Rate Guide, Winter-Spring, 1965,
issued Dec. 15, 1964.
53. Network officials claim that separate purchase of program and time under the
rate card yield roughly the same net price as "package minute" purchases to advertisers of
the same size. Time sold on a "bargain basement" basis is of course less costly.
54. Professor Corwin Edwards distinguishes between "quantity" discounts - those
based on the amount of a product bought in a single purchase - and "volume" discounts
- those based on cumulative purchases during a stated period. EDWARDS, Tim Paer
Disc miNATioN LAw 208-10 (1959). The former are somewhat more likely to have some
relation to costs. This definitional distinction is not always made in the opinions or in
legal writing, although it is useful. We use the term "volume" discount throughout, in
part because "dollars" and "time" seem more appropriately described in those terms and
in part because the important network discounts are cumulative in nature. Note, however,
that the lower rate for a one-hour period than for four quarter-hour periods bears some
similarity to a "quantity" discount, as do, to a lesser degree, continuity elements when
a sponsor buys the same program, time and network line-up for a number of weeks.
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tant respects.55 First, customers who are discriminated against are thought to
be weakened in their ability to compete effectively with their favored rivals;
here, network volume discounts which substantially favor the largest adver-
tisers may give them a decisive advantage over their smaller competitors. And
second, the seller doing the discriminating may thereby buttress his market
position vis-4-vis actual and potential competitors by making it more difficult
for them to secure any part of the business of many of his buyers; network
volume discounts may in this way handicap marginal competitors or potential
entrants in network television, "spot" advertising, independent program pro-
duction, and other media. Volume discounts also interfere with the freedom of
even the favored party to allocate his purchases among competing suppliers
in relation solely to their relative merits.
The network discounts also produce tying effects of a kind regarded as anti-
competitive in antitrust analysis. Tying arrangements require that the buyer or
lessee of one product (the "tying" product) also take from the seller some
other product (the "tied" product), or give an advantageous price on the ty-
ing product to a purchaser who takes the tied product.50 The most obvious
tying effects in television rate structures sten from discounts which tend to
force advertisers who wish to buy prime evening time to take marginal day
time and summer hours as well, and to take all or most of the stations in the
network. In general, "tie-ins," like volume discounts, interfere with the free-
dom of the buyer to arrange his purchases of the "tied" product in terms of
the relative merits of competing sellers. They may also distort or impair com-
petition in the markets for the products involved. Competing producers of the
"tied" product are deprived of opportunities to sell their output on the basis
of its relative price and quality. And actual and potential producers of the
"tying" product may find that the "tie-in" has the effect of reducing the price
of the "tying" product in such a way that a competitor must produce and sell
both it and the tied product if he wishes to compete on equal terms. This
fact may give the well financed incumbent a competitive advantage over the
marginal firm.57 The special importance of this effect in the television industry
will be noted after an examination of the classes of discounts which make up
the heart of the networks' rate structures.
55. The economic theory of price discrimination is extensively considered in MACnLuP,
THE POLITICAL ECONOmY OF MONOPOLY 135-68 (1952), but without special treatment of
volume discounts. See also Clemens, Price Discrimination and the Multiple Product Firm,
19 REv. EcoN. STUDIES 1 (1951); DEAx, IfANAGEmRAr EcoNomcs 508-09 (1951); Dam.
The Economics of Price Discrimination: Herein of Three Regulatory Schemes, 31 U.Cnl.
L. REv. 1 (1963). Cf., the legal-economic treatment in EDWARDs, THS Paicn DIscRIMInA-
TioN LAw 208-70 (1959).
56. See generally Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Levecrage Problem, 67 YALEs
L.J. 19 (1957); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HAIv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
57. Price discrimination as a barrier to the entry of new competitors is considered
in BAin, BAnItRS TO NEW Coi'mp 'ox 27 (1956).
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By and large, the three major networks' discount structures are sufficiently
different to require separate description. However, in certain basic features
they are nearly the same. For each network, purchases of time in segments
smaller than one hour are priced on the basis of varying percentages of the
hourly rate. On ABC and CBS, for example, one-sixth of an hour - the
time entitling the advertiser to one commercial minute rs - costs one-fifth as
much as the applicable hourly rate. Thus the advertiser buying time in a one-
hour block has a 16-2/3 per cent price advantage over the purchaser of a sin-
gle commercial minute. NBC's rates create an even greater price differential;
one quarter hour costs two-fifths as much as the hourly rate.
Although none of the networks describe this "less-than-hourly" rate basis
as a discount, the rate has a volume discount effect which will be most strong-
ly felt by single-product firms whose advertising budgets preclude full-hour
sponsorships.
To assure that these rate advantages as well as the discounts to be dis-
cussed are not transferable, each network insulates segments of its market. No
two advertisers may purchase time jointly to take advantage of discounts; no
time may be purchased as a unit by an agent and then resold. However, a
multi-product firm, even though working through a number of different adver-
tising agencies and marketing products which are functionally dissimilar, may
combine advertising for all its products to take full advantage of the discount
structure. A network advertiser may also use different commercials on dif-
ferent stations in the line-up which has been ordered. For example, a company
which markets coffee in the East and soap in the West may purchase the entire
network, supplying the entire country with the same program but using coffee
commercials in the East and soap commercials in the West.
Each of the networks also has a minimum time purchase or "must buy"
requirement. On ABC an advertiser must purchase a minimum of $90,000
worth of station time for each Class "A" hour. The hourly minimum is re-
duced in proportion to the lower rates for other time periods. An order for
one hour of daytime on ABC must total at least $30,000 worth of station
time. NBC puts its larger minimum figure in more flexible language. Its rate
card reads:
In order to serve the public interest in having NBC television programs
available on a national basis and to maintain the network function as an
effective national advertising medium, orders for NBC Television Net-
work facilities are subject to acceptability of the station lineup ordered.
Consistent with the foregoing objectives, a station lineup order shall be
deemed acceptable if the Class A hourly rates of the stations ordered total
$100,000 or more.59
The current CBS rate card is equally flexible; it reserves the right to reject
orders which the network deems too small.
58. See note 50 supra.
59. NBC does mitigate the impact of its "must-buy" requirement by providing that
it will consider "for individual approval" orders for station lineups of less than $100,000,
See NBC Television Network Rate Guide, supra note 52.
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Minimum purchase requirements have a tying effect. They encourage ad-
vertisers who want network time to order all or most of the stations with the
highest rates, including the five stations owned by each of the networks. Use
of the large stations is in effect "tied" to use of network time. The five NBC-
owned stations, for example, have a combined Class "A" hourly rate of
$25,400, slightly over one-fourth the required minimum order. The 56 stations
next highest in price have a combined rate of $75,285. The remaining 101
interconnected affiliates have a combined rate of $40,465. In theory it would
be possible for an advertiser to order a station line-up which would include
almost all the stations in the NBC network but omit a number of stations
with high network hourly rates and because of the omission not meet the mini-
mum dollar requirement.
The NBC minimum requirements also have the effect of foreclosing the
use of network television to advertisers not interested in the Eastern time
zone. The rate total for NBC stations in the Central, Mountain and Pacific
zones is $75,980; this is $24,020 short of the NBC minimum. Conversely it is
possible for an advertiser to purchase the network without including the
Pacific or Mountain regions. The combined rate for stations in the Eastern
and Central zones on NBC is $122,360. 60
In addition to the minimum gross time requirements and the volume dis-
count effect inherent in the hourly rate structure, each network has an elabo-
rate system of special discounts described in the rate cards. Different termi-
nology and formulae are used to define classes of available discounts and
methods of discount calculation, but all three systems appear to be similar in
objective and effect.
ABC Rate Card. ABC's discounts are expressed as percentages to be sub-
tracted from the gross rate calculated by adding the time segment rates of
ordered stations.
First, a "dollar volume" discount is effective for gross time purchases of
more than $100,000 annually. The discount begins at 2 per cent and increases
through twelve brackets to 15 per cent for purchases of $5,200,000 and over.
Since it increases in proportion to the dollar value of network time purchased
and is not a function of any other variable, it is analytically a straight volume
discount.
In addition to straight volume discounts ABC offers "time period" dis-
counts. Full "time period" discounts are available to "every week" advertisers
purchasing 52 commercial minutes in a 26-week period. Smaller minima are
60. The beer industry provides a striking example of the exclusion of regional manu-
facturers from network television. Beer is for the most part a regional business. Only
five of the several hundred brewers market their products nationally. In 1960 brewers
spent $50.2 million ofn television advertising. Most of the advertising was in the form of
spots on individual stations. $43.4 million of the total went toward spot television and
$6.8 million went toward network television. The five brewers engaged in national dis-
tribution accounted for almost $4.4 million of the network total. Kroeger, Keeping Up
With The New Generation, Television Magazine, May, 1961, pp. 55, 86.
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prescribed for the fourteen week summer season, for daytime hours, and for
"alternate week" advertisers.61 Advertisers who earn a "time period" discount
on periods other than daytime may take it on daytime as well, but not vice-
versa. "Time period" discounts can be substantial for periods other than prime
time in the winter season, on which no discount is allowed. "Every week"
discounts range from 4 per cent to 12 per cent in the winter period depending
on the time period of the program, and from 36 per cent to 48 per cent in the
summer period. "Alternate week" discounts are half the "every week" dis-
counts.
02
The "time period" discount is a volume discount conditioned on continuity.
The minimum purchase requirement provides the volume discount element. The
discount tends to "tie" daytime to preferred time by selling daytime at a greater
discount to those who have satisfied the volume and continuity requirements
in preferred time slots. The fact that the lower rates for summer and daytime
are expressed in terms of discounts rather than network hourly rates provides
an incentive for affiliates to use network daytime programs and to stay with
61. Because different minima are prescribed for daytime, the rate card includes
provisions for purchases including daytime and other time. It reads:
An advertiser who fulfills the minimum requirement for every week time period
discount in groups A, B, and C [time groupings] will earn every week time period
discounts on concurrent Group D purchases; however, purchases in Group D may
not be used to fulfill the requirements for time period discounts in Groups A, B,
and C. An advertiser who fulfills the minimum requirement for alternate week
time period discounts in Groups A, B, and C may earn every week time period
discounts on Group D purchases provided he fulfills separately the minimum re-
quirement for alternate week discounts in Group D during the concurrent period.
ABC Television Network Rate Card No. 10, p. 4, supra note 52.
62. The following is the table for ABC time period discounts:
TIME PERIOD DISCOUNTS
Applicable Time Period Discounts
Every Week Alternate Weeks
Group Time Period Winter Summer Winter Summer
A 6:00 to 8:00 P.M.
Mon. thru Fri. 12% 48% 6% 24%
6:00 to 7:30 P.M.
Sat. and Sun.
B 8:00 to 8:30 P.M.
Mon. thru Fri. 4% 42% 2% 21%
10:00 to 11:00 P.M.
Sun. thru. Sat.
C 7:30 to 10:30 P.M.
Sat. and Sun. 0% 36% 0% 18%
8:30 to 10:30 P.M.
Mon. thru Fri.
D All Class C and Class
D time periods 12% 40% 6% 20%
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the network over the less attractive summer months. Although the network
retains a higher percentage of receipts during the lush hours and seasons,
affiliate income tends to be stabilized throughout the year.
An advertiser whose time purchases in a discount yearG3 are in excess of
$5,200,000 may elect to take an "overall" discount in lieu of "dollar volume"
and "time period" discounts. Prime time is eligible for a 25 per cent discount,
special programs 15 per cent, and all other purchases 30 per cent. Once an
advertise passes the $5,200,000 mark he may elect to take fie "overall" dis-
count on purchases which have qualified him for it, and to take other applicable
discounts on additional purchases if the other discounts are larger. The "over-
all" discount is a slightly refined form of volume discount. It comes into effect
at the upper end of the "dollar volume" discount scale and gives a special
premium to the largest advertisers. Advertisers below the minimum purchase
requirements are encouraged by the "time period" discount to concentrate
purchases in the less-favored hours and seasons. The largest advertisers are
freed to pattern their purchases as they choose and still receive larger dis-
counts than their smaller competitors.
In addition to the other discounts on the rate card a "daytime premium"
discount is allowed to all purchasers of time between 11 a.n. and 5 p.m.,
ranging from 1 per cent for the purchase of 52 quarter-hours "t to 5 per cent
for 260 or more quarter-hours in a discount year. The discount applies to the
purchase of all time other than daytime. The "daytime premium" discount ties
daytime to highly valuable prime time since it is available only to purchasers
of time in both categories. The more daytime is purchased, the lower the price
for prime time. This is a tying arrangement effectuated through a progressive
unit volume discount.
ABC offers time on a number of its affiliates as a bonus for the purchase
of the other affiliates. In a few cases the bonus is contingent on the inclusion
of a particular station. For example, a purchaser of time on KVIP-TV, Red-
ding, California, receives time on KVIQ-TV, Eureka, California, free of
charge. Finally, a number of stations are offered at combination rates. For
example, KOOK-TV, Billings; KXLF-TV, Butte; KFBB-TV, Great Falls;
KID-TV, Idaho Falls; and KLIX-TV, Twin Falls, are sold at a combination
rate of $807.50 per Class "A" hour. If purchased individually their network
rates would total $950 per Class "A" hour. These are tying arrangements of
the "block-booking" variety.65
63. A discount year is established by an advertiser's first telecast, and runs for 52
consecutive weeks. ABC Network Rate Card No. 10, supra note 52, at 3.
64. Daytime is sold in quarter hour segments which carry three commercial minutes.
See note 50 supra. Discounts involving daytime do in fact encourage its use. See Networks
Happy Daytime, Broadcasting, August 5, 1953, p. 36.
65. The "block booking" type of "tie-in" came to attention in the antitrust prosecu-
tions in the motion picture industry that eventuated in the Paramount Pictures litigation.
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CBS Rate Card. The CBS network classification system differs slightly from
that of the other networks. Class "A" prime time is between 6 p.m. and 11
p.m. The rate for all other time, with the exception of time on weekday after-
noons and Saturday mornings, is 50 per cent of the Class "A" rates. "Week-
day afternoon, Saturday morning" time rates are based on volume. Purchasers
of 260 quarter-hour segments within a contract year pay 9.375 per cent of the
Class "A" prime time rates. The rate increases through five brackets to 15 per
cent of the Class "A" rates for users of 51 or fewer quarter-hours. Although
this discount is in part simply a way of setting lower rates for less preferred
time, it contains a progressive volume discount element.
CBS offers an "annual" discount of 10 per cent on all time charges continu-
ing for 26 consecutive fortnights and which are the result of two separate
sponsorships within each fortnight and, with certain exceptions, fall in the same
time classification. A 5 per cent discount is allowed on charges which run for
twenty-six consecutive fortnights if the other requirements for the 10 per cent
discount have not been met.60 The minimum continuity requirement results in
a volume discount effect. The advertiser who cannot undertake so large a
commitment is ineligible. Of course, the required commitment would be less
for less desirable time, so it is not a straight dollar volume discount. The
discount also ties summer time to more desirable time by requiring a full-year
commitment.
Advertisers purchasing time in 26 week blocks are eligible for the CBS
"station-hour" discount. The size of the discount is determined by the number
of station-hours used each fortnight; four hours on a single station or a single
hour on four stations would each constitute four station-hours. The discounts
range through eight brackets applicable to each of five different time periods,
and range from zero to 10 per cent for users of between 80 and 119 station-
hours per fortnight and from 10 per cent to 20 per cent for users of 240 or
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948). Distributors refused
to license individual feature films to exhibitors unless they took an entire "package" of
films. The tying effects inherent in the network rate structures resemble more nearly
block-booklng than they do the type of tie-in in which the lessee of an office machine,
for example, is required to buy certain classes of supplies for the machine front the
lessor. See, e.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936).
66. The other requirements for the 10% discount include using sponsorship units not
less than one-quarter hour in duration for wholly sponsored time segments, or not less
than twenty minutes in duration for shared-sponsorship night-time segments. Sponsor-
ships in two different time classifications may be combined for discount purposes if the
aggregate time with the lower rate is equal to or greater than the time in the time classifi-
cation with the higher rate. The language of the CBS rate card on these points suggests
that the "annual" discount applies to participations as well as to straight sponsorship,
See CBS Television Network Rate Card No. 16, supra note 52.
A high percentage of advertisers who purchase participations are making their purchases
on a year-round rather than a seasonal basis. See In-and-Out Participations Losing
Ground, Broadcasting, July 29, 1963, p. 28.
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more.67 Again the minimum continuity requirement results in a volume dis-
count effect and is reinforced by the progressive discounts available as more
station-hours are used. Since moving up the brackets is not based on aggre-
gate charges, however, it is not a straight dollar-volume discount, although the
effect is the same.
CBS allows an "over-all" discount in lieu of "annual" and "station-hour"
discounts to advertisers purchasing a weekly minimum of $130,000 of station
time, or averaging that amount in consecutive two-week periods during a
discount year. The discount ranges from 20 to 30 per cent depending on the
time period.68 Like ABC's "overall" discount, this is a premium volume dis-
count available to the very large advertisers only. It also tends to tie summer
time to more desirable time by its requirement that purchases extend through-
out the year.
The CBS "extended market plan" is designed to increase the use of certain
stations not usually included in network orders. Additional discounts are given
on the purchase of time on these stations. The amount of the discount depends
on the number of stations ordered: if ten are ordered, the additional discount
is 5 per cent off the price of time on the stations involved after other dis-
counts have been subtracted; if the entire group of stations is ordered, the ad-
ditional discount on the group is 25 per cent. The primary effect of the dis-
count is to encourage advertisers to take marginal stations by reducing the
net cost of using them, without reducing the stations' rates. It also has a cer-
tain volume discount effect in that these stations will normally be considered
only if the budget permits going beyond the more important population centers.
. NBC Rate Card. NBC's discount schedule systematically takes into account
the existence not only of "conventional sponsorship" but of the growth of im-
portance of "package minute" and "participation" deals. Regularly sponsored
series of "packaged minutes" are given equivalent values in determining the
67. The following table in the CBS rate card is used to determine the station hour
discount:
TIME PERIODS
Station 6:00 7:30 8:30 9:00 All
Hours to to to to other
Per 7:30 8:30 9:00 10:30
Fortnight p.m. p.m. p.m. p.m.
Less than 80 none none none none none
80-119 10% 7.5% 5% none 5%
120-139 15% 12.5% 10% 5% 10%
140-159 16% 13.5% 11% 6% 11%
160-179 17% 14.5% 12% 7% 12%
180-199 18% 15.5% 13% 8% 13%
200-239 19% 16.5% 14% 9% 14%
240 or over 20% 17.5% 15% 10% 15%
68. The overall discount does not apply to purchases in the weekday afternoon,
Saturday morning category, or to any programs for which a special rate is in effect.
There is, however, no indication as to whether purchases in these categories contribute
to the necessary minimum purchase requirement.
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availability of certain discounts.6 9 As do the other networks, NBC measures
discounts on the basis of the percentage of the full hourly rate paid rather than
the -fraction of the hour used.
A "line-up incentive" discount is given on gross time charges of a "conven-
tional sponsorship" continuing for six consecutive fortnights, on a weekly or
alternate-weekly basis. It is based on the aggregate gross prime-time rates of
all stations ordered and on the time period used. The discount ranges from
zero for a station line-up whose Class "A" rates total $110,000 or less, to
as much as 10 per cent for a line-up of $140,000 and over. This discount is
in part a straight volume discount, although eligibility is based not on the
actual gross rate but on the aggregate prime time rates. The minimum con-
tinuity requirement adds slightly to the volume discount effect. However, it
also ties time on marginal stations to time on large stations in the sense that
when all or a large part of the network is purchased, the reduced rate on time
on the more valuable stations produces the most substantial savings.
10
An additional "fortnightly" discount is allowed advertisers who sponsor a
program on a weekly basis for 13 consecutive fortnights or on an alternate
week basis and also purchase three packaged evening minutes per fortnight for
the same period. The discount is based on the aggregate percentage of the full
network hourly rate ordered per fortnight. If 80 per cent of the full hourly
rate has been used, the discount is 2 per cent; discounts range through nine
brackets to 10 per cent for 240 per cent. These are progressive percentage
volume discounts based on dollar equivalents.
An "annual" discount of 10 per cent is allowed on gross time charges of a
"conventional sponsorship" which runs for 52 consecutive weeks in the same
period and of the same duration each week. A 5 per cent discount is given for
52 weeks of alternate week sponsorship. This discount's continuity requirement
69. The applicable portion of the rate card reads as follows:
Contributory effect of packaged evening minutes: Each packaged evening minute
(between 7-11 PM NYCT) contributes 20% to the aggregate percentage of the
hourly rate per fortnight provided that it is part of a regularly sponsored series of
minutes scheduled in the same program for a minimum of twenty-six weeks on a
weekly or alternate weekly basis.
Three packaged evening minutes (between 7-11 PM NYCT) contribute to the
establishment of Fortnightly or Comprehensive Discount entitlement and raise the
Annual Discount from 5% to 10% when combined with an alternate weekly pro-
gram sponsored on a conventional basis, provided that each such minute is a part
of a regularly sponsored series of minutes scheduled in the same program over the
entire term of the conventional sponsorship. Contributory effect of packaged day-
time quarter hours and minutes: Each daytime quarter hour and minute (between
9 AM-6 PM NYCT) contributes to the aggregate percentage of the hourly rate
per fortnight provided that each is a part of a regularly sponsored series of quarter
hours or minutes scheduled in the same program for a minimum of twenty-six weeks
on a weekly or alternate weekly basis.
Daytime Quarter Hour contributes 20%
Daytime Minute contributes 6-213%
NBC Television Network Rate Guide, supra note 52.
70. This discount also tends to favor advertisers using primarily the Eastern segment
of the country and advertisers who use the most expensive stations on the network list.
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results in both a volume discount and a tying effect, since an advertiser must
purchase summer time to obtain the lower rates on more desirable time.
The advertiser may either add the "fortnightly" discount, the "line-up in-
centive" discount and the "annual" discount, or may elect to take a "compre-
hensive" discount. The "comprehensive" discount is allowed on conventional
sponsorships which run for 52 consecutive weeks and which total at least 240
per cent of the full network hourly time rate each fortnight. An advertiser who
sponsors a program on an alternate week basis for 52 weeks and who buys a
minimum of three packaged minutes qualifies for the comprehensive discount
if the total expenditure is over 240 per cent of the full network rate each fort-
night. The size of the "comprehensive" discount is tied to the gross prime time
rates of stations ordered and to the time period for which they are ordered.
If the line-up ordered is $110,000, the "comprehensive" discount in the 6-8:30
period will be 24 per cent and the discount in the 8:30 to 9 p.m. period will
be 21.5 per cent. No "comprehensive" discount is allowed for other periods.
If the line-up is $140,000 or more, the comprehensive discount in the 5-8:30
period is 30 per cent and is 25 per cent in the 9-10:30 p.m. period." Maxi-
mum "comprehensive" discounts are available only if the advertiser uses sub-
stantially all of the network. The rate for 157 stations in prime time is $140,-
150. The full network adds but five stations for a total rate of $141,150. The
"comprehensive" discount is another premium volume discount for very large
advertisers. Unlike the comparable ABC discount, it does not, however, free
the large volume purchaser from the compulsion exerted by lesser discounts.
It ties summer time to more desirable time by its 52-week requirement. It ties
prime time to use of marginal stations by allowing discounts on it only as the
advertiser adds stations to the "basic" network; it also ties marginal stations
to the more desirable outlets.
Under the NBC "program extension" plan, advertisers who use a select
group of additional stations receive a dividend based on the number of stations
in the plan which are used. If less than $1,200 worth of time on the select
71. The following discount table is used by NBC to calculate comprehensive discounts
and station lineup discounts:
TABtI. OF
UNEUP INCNHTIVE AHD COMPR 4H$S DISCOUNTS
Wad C3rv I G.,"-.p. I V
Io2T Pj4.*11 e.uIn T 9. I'
ISStian$110,000 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% O.0 0.O%
$110,000to$114,999 4.0 24.0 1.5 215 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
$115,000to$119,999 5.0 25.0 2.5 22.5 0.0 20.0 0.0 20.0
$120,000to$124,999 6.0 26.0 35 23.5 0.5 21.0 0.5 21.0
$125,000 to $129.999 7.0 27.0 4.5 24.5 1.5 22.0 L 22.0
$130,000toS134.999 8.0 28.0 5.5 25.5 2.5 23.0 1.5 23.0
$135,000to$139.999 9.0 29.0 6.5 26.5 3.5 24.0 2.0 24.0
$140,000 and over 10.0, 30.0 7.5 27.5 4.5 25.0 2.5 25.0
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group of stations is used, there is no "dividend." If more than $2,000 worth
of time is used the stations are thrown in free.
It should not be assumed that the rate cards define the only or most sub-
stantial discounts which may be obtained. Each card carefully denies that it
constitutes "an offer" or "commitment," the rate being "subject to change
without notice." The CBS rate card explicitly notes:
The CBS Television Network has in effect special rates applicable during
certain time periods and for certain programs, as well as an adjusted base
rate for the benefit of purchases in Class A time in excess of 180 aggre-
gate minutes per fortnight in Class A time. Information regarding these
rates is available on request.
7 2
Even limiting attention to the rate card discounts, however, their uniform
effect is to give substantial advantages to advertisers able to deploy large ad-
vertising budgets over full-hour time purchases, full-network station line-ups
and full-year advertising - or at least purchases of substantial blocks of con-
secutive weekly time.
The combinations under the various discount systems can yield great dif-
ferences between the cost of a marginal "commercial minute" to a large user
and to a one time user. To devise an extreme case, based on the ABC rate
card, The Little Company may want a single commercial minute between 6
and 8 p.m. on a summer weekday. His cost for the full network would be 20
per cent of the full hourly rate. His competitor, Big Boy, advertising in full
hour segments throughout the year, pays 16-2/3 per cent of the full hourly
rate for the same "commercial minute," then deducts a 15 per cent "dollar
volume" discount, a 48 per cent summer "every week" "time period" discount
and a 5 per cent "daytime premium" discount for a net difference in cost of
about 75 per cent. The inclusion of "bonus stations" and the cost advantage of
combination rates might add one or two percentage points to the net difference
in cost.
The preceding analysis has identified discriminatory volume discounts and
tying arrangements in the television discount structure. Further inquiry is in
order to suggest possible reasons why such practices are used by the networks.
Volume discount effects. Economic analysis does not provide a general theory
to explain Volume discounts. In fhe case of discount structures as complex as
those in the network rate cards, it is- likely that a number of factors are in-
volved. Discounts which depend on the sponsorship of programs on a regular
basis probably reflect some degree of real cost savings. Selling costs and other
administrative service costs are doubtless less than directly proportional to
time billirigs as the continuity of a sponsored program increases. Similarly,
discounts which produce proportionately lower rates for full-hour sponsorship
than for fractions of" hours probably reflect to a degree real cost savings in
dealing with larger units. A similar analysis would apply to -discounts based
on station line-ups. Some of the costs of putting a program and related com-
mercials on a network hook-up - interconnection costs - are not directly
72. CBS Television Network Rate Card No, 16, supra note 52.
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proportional to the number of stations which carry them. Discounts which
encourage the use of less desirable time, such as summer time, may produce
real savings by encouraging fuller use of network facilities in periods when
they would otherwise be underused.
Insofar as volume discounts precisely reflect real cost savings, they are not
open to criticism. Three facts, however, stand out. Some of the most substan-
tial discounts, such as ABC's straight "dollar volume" discount, have no dis-
cernible link to any plausible cost savings hypothesis because they are linked
only to aggregate charges, regardless of how they were accrued. Second, sev-
eral of the types of discounts which night be related to some plausible cost
savings hypothesis are structured in such a way as to defeat any argument
that their purpose is to reflect such savings. For example, the NBC "station
line-up" discounts increase in a linear manner and are based on the stations'
prime time network charges, while any theory of cost savings attributable to
a larger line-up would certainly have to be related to numbers of stations -
not their charges - and result in a flat rate beyond the minimum point
at which fixed costs cease to be a factor. Another example is NBC's "com-
prehensive" discount. Although cost factors might arguably justify a somewhat
lower average rate to a regular sponsor making a commitment for 52 consecu-
tive weeks, this discount treats 52-week continuity as a minimum qualification
and its size increases with total expenditures. Third, and most important, the
discounts seem to be enormously larger than cost savings could possibly justify.
Thus other explanations must be sought. These require a short excursion
into the economic theory of pricing under conditions of imperfect competition.
A television network, viewed as a supplier of an economic "good," may be
thought of as a "multi-product" firm which offers an almost unlimited variety
of very similar but slightly differentiated wares. Indeed, at least for the larger
advertiser-buyer, the "product" - a "program-network time" package - may
in effect be custom-made. The major variable components of the product are
program (which the buyer may in some cases create or help design himself),
time of day, season of the year, and number and identity of individual stations
in the network.
Because each available combination of these components is, in some meas-
ure, unique and each may be regarded by different potential purchasers as
having differing utility in carrying out an over-all advertising campaign, a
situation exists in which there is a strong tendency for the price as well as the
configuration of each package to be set through individual bargaining between
buyer and seller. From the network's point of view, economic theory suggests
that this form of "perfect" price discrimination 73 would result in maximum
profits in the exploitation of its market position, neglecting the costs of ad-
ministering such a regime. Prices would be discriminatory both in the sense
that the prices of different packages would not bear the same relationship to
their costs, and in that there would be no reason to expect that competing
73. See AfCHLup, op. cit. supra note 55, at 138.
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buyers would pay the same price for packages which would produce equivalent
audiences.
But purely "personal" discrimination of this type may entail prohibitively
high administrative costs in bargaining and contract negotiation, especially
with hundreds of smaller advertisers. Furthermore, unless all network bar-
gainers are superbly adroit, the actual results they achieve are likely to be
less favorable than those which would result from application of a uniform
formula which incorporates systematic discriminations. Also, because of the
role of advertising agencies in bargaining for numerous advertisers, a rela-
tively stable system must be used to prevent difficulties with advertisers who
find themselves discriminated against. Such systems must, of course, reflect
accurately the characteristics of the aggregate demand of the relevant seg-
ments of the market and be flexible enough to allow for individual adjustment
by direct negotiations in unusual and important cases.
Not only in television, but, as we have noted, throughout the advertising in-
dustry rate cards invariably include large, systematic volume discounts. In ad-
dition to, and of much more importance than, whatever costs savings they may
arguably reflect, one may suppose that a rate card evolves through experience
in bargaining with advertisers and reflects roughly the range of price elasticities
of demand of advertisers for time or space in the particular medium. These
elasticities depend, in turn, on the available alternatives. A television network,
for example, is in competition as a national advertising medium, in varying
degrees, with other networks, "spot" time arranged with individual stations,
radio, newspapers, magazines and outdoor advertising. Each of these provides
an alternative to buying the product of a particular network. A large ad-
vertiser may be given lower prices, in the form of volume discounts, because
he can work out "substitute" arrangements not equally available to smaller
advertisers.
The competing television networks, of course, provide the closest substitute.
The relatively high fixed costs and lower marginal costs which characterize
network television - in part reflecting the fact that a network provides its
affiliates with programming throughout the broadcast day every day in the
year - give large advertisers a very strong bargaining position. The loss of
a large advertiser to another network might substantially impair a net-
work's chances in the all-important annual race for viewer ratings, in part
because his support of costly, high-rated programs would be lost. This in turn
would reduce the attractiveness of adjacent times. Smaller advertisers do not
wield so potent a bargaining weapon.
Larger advertisers also may be better able to shift a part of their activity
into effective "spot" advertising. One form of "spot" activity permits an ad-
vertiser to develop its own programming to be aired on independent stations
and on whatever network affiliates can be persuaded to reject network pro-
grams. Another form is the purchase of "spot" time on network affiliates be-
tween network programs on a nationwide basis. Either alternative - in effect,
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putting together a kind of "private network" - is more readily available to
advertisers with substantial television advertising budgets than to smaller ad-
vertisers. An advertiser with a large budget is in a better position to produce
programs which are comparable in quality to network programming. Only very
high quality programs will attract affiliates away from the networks.
Finally, it may be suggested that volume discounts may simply reflect de-
creasing marginal utility to individual users of increasing quantities of the
product, much as rates for electricity, for example, may be structured to reflect
its different value in lighting, heating and industrial uses.74 This suggestion
fails to take account of the derivative nature of tile demand for television ad-
vertising and the fact that the rate card discounts apply equally to companies
which advertise numerous products or brands and those which advertise only
one.
"Tie-in" effects. Many of the discounts which result in preferences for
quantity buyers also, as we have noted, contain "tying" elements. They use
graduated discount rates which become applicable to the most expensive
(prime evening) time only if off-hour or off-season time is also purchased, if
marginal stations are also used, or if "continuity" is maintained in program
sponsorship. The time-cards do not say "You can use prime evening time only
if you take marginal time or stations," as in a traditional tie-in, but "You will
benefit from maximum discounts on all your time purchases only if you take
marginal time or stations." Both restrict the free choice of the buyer.
Economic analysis suggests that tying is a sensible mode of maximizing
profits, at least in the short run, only in rather special situations. It is usually
more profitable - because less coercive - simply to price each of the "tied"
elements as supply and demand dictate. A tie-in may be preferable, however,
if increasing the price of the "tying" product is impossible because of some
form of price regulation or undesirable because it would invite political or
administrative intervention. A tie-in may also be tactically sound if a substan-
tial price increase would tend to attract new competitors who would be less
likely to enter if they were required also to deal in the "tied" commodity. In
these cases the price of the "tied" product is set higher than the market would
otherwise dictate to offset the artificially low price charged for the "tying"
product.
Perhaps the most likely explanation for the presence of tying arrangements
in the discount rate structures is that networks prefer to keep prime time
rates artificially low in comparison with daytime and summertime rates. Or
conversely, the networks wish to encourage use of daytime and summertime
hours at rates which are somewhat higher than the market would seem to call
for, and are willing to sacrifice short-run maximum profits on sale of evening
time to accomplish this result. Instead of allowing prime time rates to seek
their normal higher level - which increment the networks would share with
74. See TROXEL, EcoNoMIcs op PuBLIc UTILITIES 619-86 (1947); see generally
GARsItn & LovEjoy, PuBric UTILrTY EcoNomncs (1964).
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stations on a percentage basis - the networks in effect "take" the difference
the market would bear by arranging discounts to encourage use of time which
is "overpriced." The stations in turn get more return for staying with the net-
work during these "off" periods than they could otherwise. Because all dis-
counts are out of the networks' share, they are foregoing immediate profit to
produce this result, and at least some stations are getting somewhat more than
their contractual share would be if market forces alone determined rate levels.
Another reason for a rate structure which results in the spreading of adver-
tisers' expenditures over less desirable time and stations might be suggested.
Use of marginal facilities or times by those who buy evening time is encour-
aged. It might be urged that in this way cost savings are achieved by more
efficient, even use of network facilities. But presumably the same result could
be achieved, without expensive coercion, by simply reducing the rates for
marginal times and stations.
One further tying effect must be mentioned, although it necessarily does not
appear from our rate card analysis. There is a strong belief in important seg-
ments of the industry that the networks have tended to tie programs in which
they have an interest to the sale of the most attractive evening time slots. This
may be an effort to capture more of the value of the most attractive evening
time for themselves by taking the profit on the program rather than sharing it
with affiliates through the higher prime time rates the market would seemingly
bear.75
III. THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF NETWORK RATE DiscouNTS
There are four major markets in which the effects of a network's discount
system are most likely to be felt. First, as has been suggested by the imme-
diately preceding discussion, an important impact is felt on competition within
network television. Second, important effects are felt in the media most direct-
ly competitive or potentially competitive with network television for advertis-
ing; these are (a) "spot" advertising and (b) independent telecasting, includ-
ing UHF. Remote effects may be expected on media less immediately com-
petitive with the television networks, such as radio, newspapers, and maga-
zines. Third, important effects are felt among independent program producers
who increasingly find themselves foreclosed from markets for their product.
Finally, perhaps the most far-reaching anticompetitive effects are those "in-
direct" ones which result from adding an important incentive to mergers and
other measures leading to "conglomerate" size in industries for which tele-
vision advertising is important.
75. There is even a suggestion that network executives have taken a personal profit
on programming "tied" to prime evening time. A stockholders derivative suit filed in New
York Supreme Court on March 29, 1965 alleges that Mr. James Aubrey, subsequently
fired as president of CBS, "conspired" to share in the profits of Richlieu Productions, Inc.,
a company that supplied programs to CBS. Both Aubrey and CBS have denied the allega-
tion. New York Times, March 30, 1965, p. 93, col. 5.
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A. Effects on Competition within the Television Industry
Anticompetitive effects: Network television. The discussion in the preceding
section considers how bargaining between advertisers and networks may have
resulted in the discounts reflected in the rate cards. Another ray of looking
at the discount structures directs attention to their role as means of competitive
rivalry. For example, a nework which first establishes a margin of advantage
over its competitors, by virtue of being there first or for some other reason,
will find it advantageous to induce its largest customers to give it all their
business, not only for the sake of immediate profits, but to seek to prevent
them from patronizing potential or actual rivals.70 A highly "progressive" vol-
ume discount structure is most effective in this respect; a marginal advertising
dollar spent with the first organization will buy very substantially more time
or space than it will if it is spent with the rival, assuming comparable rate
structures. Thus a penalty that can be prohibitive in effect acts as a deterrent
on any temptation to "experiment" with a new organization or to diversify by
spreading an advertising budget among a number of competitors. Note also
that the "second" firm, once having won some adherents, must in self-defense
impose a parallel discount system. Both will now see the strategic advantage,
too, in the barrier to the entry of further new competitors which their dis-
count structures create.77
The volume discount system makes network television the least flexible of
all advertising media. In other media it is possible to decrease the volume of
advertising by eliminating a particular publication or broadcast station without
substantially changing the average cost of other units of advertising in the
media. Decreasing expenditures in network television, however, result in
higher average costs of each unit in the medium. In addition, the present
arrangements tend to discourage use of marginal times and stations by smaller
advertisers who might be attracted to them by lower prices.
78
The fact that large advertisers are under strong pressure to concentrate their
entire television advertising budget on one network means that competition
tends to be an "all-or-nothing" affair.79 If a large advertiser whose several
76. On the "mixed" purposes and effects of certain classes of business practice. see
Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitfrst Policy, 65 CoLurm. L REv. 422,
459 (1965).
77. See note 57 supra.
78. That television network discount practices place the small business advertiser at
a competitive disadvantage has been substantiated by testimony before the House Com-
mittee on Small Business. See HM RxE. No. 2571, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29, 30-36 (1963).
79. Preliminary reports on prime-time sales for the Fall 1965 television season support
the general understanding that most firms tend to concentrate their advertising on a single
network. On the basis of programs sold as of March 1, 1965, Procter & Gamble wvas the
only advertiser to purchase time on all three networks. Four advertisers purchased time
on two networks and nine others limited their purchases to a single network. Among
the firms listing purchases to a single network was Bristol Myers, the nation's third largest
advertiser. See Broadcasting, March 1, 1965, pp. 30-31.
For other examples of single advertisers concentrating advertising on a single network
see Humble Oil Buys Network TV Series, Broadcasting, July 8, 1963, p. 32 (First pur-
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major brands account for a substantial number of hours of time and program-
ming on network X decides that the ratings of the network's programs gen-
erally may be slipping, it does not have the unpenalized alternative of switch-
ing one or more brands to network Y to "diversify" and moderate the risk;
rather, the discount structure tends to demand an "all-or-nothing" move. Fur-
thermore, one or two major moves of this kind may have sufficient impact on
a network's programming and overall ratings to precipitate an exodus of
critical dimensions. It seems likely that this "feast or famine" tendency pro-
vides a fertile soil not only for the well-advertised Madison Avenue ulcer but
for forms of "wheeling and dealing" not entirely consistent with traditional
standards of competition. Furthermore, one might suggest the hypothesis that
this kind of market structure accentuates tendencies toward "wasteland" pro-
gramming.80
Anticompetitive effects: "Spot" television, UHF and other media. As a na-
tional advertising medium, network television is in competition with "spot"
television, independent stations, including UHF, radio, newspapers, magazines
and outdoor advertising. Each medium has somewhat different characteristics
which limit its interchangeability with each of the others.81 Television network
advertising is demographically unselective in comparison to magazines which
are aimed at particular age and interest groups. Conversely, the specialty
magazine does not reach network television's mass audience. Effective adver-
tising in a particular medium is generally agreed to require a minimum con-
chase of network time totalling 4 million dollars concentrated on NBC); How Breck
Found its Own TV Formula, Broadcasting, October 23, 1961, p. 26. (Case history of a
decision to concentrate purchases on a single network and to stay out of spot market.)
80. "I invite you to sit down in front of your television set when your station goes on
the air ... and keep your eyes glued to that set until the station signs off. I can assure
you that you will observe a vast wasteland." MiNow, EQUAL TIME 52 (1964) (Speech to
the National Association of Broadcasters, May 9, 1961). Advertisers confronted with
an "all or nothing" choice must weigh average network ratings heavily, Aware of the
importance of average ratings, the networks may be unwilling to air programs which
have a high cultural value but lesser popular appeal even though they are fully sponsored.
They are fearful that such programs will pull down average ratings for an evening and
for the entire schedule. The problem of average rating may tend to inhibit network wll-
lingness to experiment with new types of programs for much the same reason. See note
38 supra.
81. The technical differences between media limits competition between them to
some extent. Newspapers deliver a printed message but are limited in their ability to
use color or to offer large secondary audiences. Magazines offer high quality color repro-
duction and secondary readership, but lack the vocal impact of radio. Television and
radio both have vocal impact but both are limited in time; if a commercial message is
missed, it is lost. These differences tend to make inter-media comparisons difficult, and
considerations other than cost play a large role. However, if the cost differential is suffi-
ciently large or if the advertising money to be spent is in addition to the usual commit-
ment, the competition between media comes into play. See generally, BuowN, LESSLEn &
WVEILBAcIER, ADVERTISING MEDIA (1957); DUNN, ADVERTISING, ITS ROLE IN MODEIN
MARKETING (1961); KIRKPATRIcK, ADVERTISING, MASS COMMUNICATION IN MARI-ETINa
(1959).
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mitment to that medium.8 2 For example, one advertisement in one issue of a
national magazine may not have enough impact to justify the expenditure.
Thus a small advertiser usually cannot "efficiently" use all media. It is only
after passing a certain minimum level of expenditure that additional funds
may be equally effectively used elsewhere. But it may be precisely at this point
that the volume discounts in network television take effect to inhibit multi-
media operations.
In spite of somewhat different characteristics, the closest substitute for net-
work television advertising is "spot" commercials on affiliated and independent
stations, including, at least potentially, UHF stations. Shifts in use between
network and "spot" advertising occur from year to year with changes in price
and market conditions.m1 Thus, apart from their effect on competition between
networks, volume discount rate structures most directly effect competition be-
tween the networks and the individual stations as sellers of "spot" time, and
the development of UHF as a potential competitor. The same kinds of effects
of network volume discounts which have been nted as present on the network
level can be expected to be felt in varying degrees by the individual stations.
Most important, the network discounts place a premium on concentrating
television advertising budgets on network television vis-i-vis other media, in-
cluding "spot" television and use of UHF facilities.
One additional impact is felt, however. The netAvork discount structures
reflect the fact that demand for television time is both highly seasonal and
concentrated during the "prime" evening hours. Were it not for discrimination
based on volume, continuity and time period, the price of prime time during
the winter would be very much higher than it is now. Except for the "tying"
effect of the network discounts, these higher prices would tend to lead to an
increase in supply. This might take the form of new VHF stations in marginal
areas, as well as new UHF stations furnished with attractive evening program-
ming by new networks, special "evening" networks or independent program
producers. Thus, advertising resources now coerced into supporting daytime
and summer programs might find their way into increased program diversity
during the hours of greatest viewer demand.
Put differently, the tendency of the present network pricing system is to
create a barrier to the entry of new stations, particularly new UHF stations.
The shortage of independent stations, in turn, inhibits the growth of new
sources of programming for such independents, including the development of
new network competition.
Anticompetitive effects: Alternative program sources. The preceding discus-
sion has suggested that insofar as network discount practices inhibit the entry
of new competition both at the network and independent station levels, they
indirectly limit the market in which independent program producers compete.
82. See BRoWN, LEssLER & WmLBAcHER, ADvRTsNG MEDiA 114-49 (1957).
83. Netvork Representation of Stations in National Spot Sales, 27 FCC 697, 714-19
(1959), recomideration denied, 28 FCC 447 (1960), aff'd sub non. Metropolitan Television
Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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There is here a self-reinforcing effect, because the shortage of available in-
dependent programming tends to put the independent station at the mercy of
the networks and in turn discourages potential entrants, especially potential
UHF licensees.
Independent program producers have also been injured by the networks'
tendency to "tie" programming in which they have an interest to prime eve-
ning time.84 This trend has been the subject of vociferous protest by independ-
ent program producers 8r and the problem is currently before the Federal
Communications Commission.80
B. Effects on Competition Outside the Television Industry
Stimulus to Mergers. Probably the most important anticompetitive effect of
network television's discount policies, for the economy as a whole, is the "arti-
ficial" stimulus to mergers which they provide. Appreciation of the significance
of this impact requires analysis of the enormous wave of industrial mergers
since World War II, and an -understanding of the importance in some indus-
tries of advertising rate policies as an incentive to acquisitions and other modes
of quick expansion.
The post-war wave of industrial mergers has been composed largely of
"conglomerate" or "diversification" mergers rather than consolidations of com-
peting firms or acquisitions for purposes of vertical integration.,, Since 1950
the 200 largest manufacturing firms alone have acquired more than 2,000 con-
cerns with combined assets of about $17.5 billion, an amount equal to about
11 per cent of the total assets of the acquiring group. 8 In the last five years,
about 70 per cent of such acquisitions have been "conglomerate" in nature.
It has recently been estimated that if present trends continue, by 1975 the 200
largest corporations will control two-thirds of the total assets of American
manufacturing corporations.8 9
Although it is clear that the current conglomerate merger movement is help-
ing to bring about "substantial and potentially fundamental changes in the
84. House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Television Network Program
Procurement, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1963).
85. A. Mueller, The Network Role in Television Program Participation, 5. ScREEN
PRODUCEns GumD, Nov. 1964, p. 3.
86. The FCC announced a notice of proposed rulemaking on March 19, 1965, The
New York Times, March 20, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.
87. W. Mueller, The Significance of Mergers Among Large Manufacturing Firms,
Revised Version of Paper given at the University of Connecticut, April 22, 1964, p. 1,
W. Mueller, The Scope of the Current Merger Movement, Statement before Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, press release dated March 16, 1965, p. 27. For an extensive and careful analysis
of conglomerate mergers, see Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1313 (1965).
88. W. Mueller, The Scope of the Current Merger Movement, Statement before
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, press release dated March 16, 1965, pp. 31-34.
89. Id. at 33.
1366 [Vol. 74:1339
TELEVISION RATE PRACTICES
structure of our economy," 90 it is less clear what the effects have been or will
be on economic efficiency in the economy or on competition as a regulator of
markets. Some economists have suggested that conglomerate mergers do not
pose an important threat to the competitive forces in the economy.01 Such
mergers do not change the market share or rank of the acquiring corporation
in any market, -as do "horizontal" consolidations, nor do they threaten direct
"foreclosure" of competitors from sources of supply or distributional outlets
as do "vertical" acquisitions.
Two important types of conglomerates are "product extension" mergers,
in which new but related products are added to the firm's line, and "market
extension" mergers, in which operations are extended into new geographic
markets or to new classes of customers.0 2 Real economies are most likely in
mergers of these types in which manufacturing methods of old and new prod-
ucts are related or distributional facilities or techniques can be joined.03 In
"pure" diversification mergers, economies are less likely and the business rea-
sons tend to boil down to simple strategic advantages of size, resulting in
money savings to the firm which are not likely to be reflected in commensu-
rate social benefits.94 Mergers which have the best claim to producing some
degree of added efficiency are also most likely to have some anticompetitive
effect. They remove from the scene those firms whose normal pattern of in-
ternal growth might most likely eventually bring them into direct competition
with their acquirer; and vice-versa, they terminate the possibility that a likely
entrant by internal expansion, the acquiring company, will add to the number
of competitors in the market of the acquired firm. Thus "potential" competi-
tion is frustrated. In addition, in some cases the competition of smaller, un-
diversified rivals of the acquired firm or, probably more important, the entry
of potential new competitors, may be impeded by strategic advantages of con-
glomerate size which are largely unrelated to efficiency. One which has recent-
ly received scrutiny is the practice of "reciprocity" in buying ;05 another may
be provided by advertising volume discount rate structures which are the sub-
ject of this study.
90. Id. at 35.
91. See, e.g., Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 Am Econ. Rev. 236, 243
(1961); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L Rsv. 176, 183-84
(1955) ; cf., Turner, supra note 87, at 1314-16.
92. These classifications are suggested in Commissioner Elman's opinion in Procter
& Gamble Co., 3 TaUAE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 1 16673 at 2165 (FTC
1963).
93. See Hale & Hale, More on Mergers, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 119, 128 (1962); Turner,
supra note 87, at 1330.
94. See, e.g., Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GE:o. L.
672, 679-80 (1958) ; Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power in Busurmss
Cox EceRxAiox Am PaxcE PoLicy 331 (1955) ; cf. Blake & Jones, In Defeue of Antitrust,
65 CoLtm. L. Rev. 377, 395-98 (1965) ; Turner, stpra note 87, at 1328-39.
95. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 3 TatE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
1116182 (FTC 1962), retid, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), order of the conmiission rein-
stated, 380 U.S. 592 (1965). See also Turner, .supra note 87, at 1386-93.
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Whatever the economic facts, Congress was expressly concerned with the
increasing fraction of industrial activity controlled by the largest companies,
and sought to slow down the conglomerate merger trend when it strengthened
the Clayton Act's antimerger provisions in 1950.06 Thus the political and social
objectives of antitrust 97 may call for a closer scrutiny of factors which en-
courage conglomerate mergers, entirely apart from speculation as to ultimate
economic effects.
Two recent Federal Trade Commission proceedings - Procter and Gamble
Co.,98 and General Foods Corp.0 - have forcefully called attention to the
volume discount system of network television as an important incentive to cer-
tain classes of conglomerate mergers in consumer goods industries. In both
cases the acquired and acquiring firms were distributors of consumer goods
whose marketing strategies required large advertising outlays, And in each a
substantial incentive for the merger was the volume discount rate structure of
advertising media generally and, in particular, volume discounts in the sale of
network television time.
Clorox merged with P & G in 1957. Clorox was the dominant manufac-
turer of household liquid bleach. At the time of the merger it had annual sales
of slightly less than $40,000,000, which represented 48.8 per cent of the na-
tional market.')0 The Commission found that Clorox was the only manufac-
turer of household liquid bleach marketing nationally, and that its industry
dominance could be explained only by its advertising and promotional activi-
ties.10' Its annual advertising expenditures were over $3,700,000, amounting
to around 10 per cent of total sales' 02 and presumably a much greater fraction
of total costs. $1,150,000 of this amount was spent for television advertis-
ing. The price of Clorox was higher than the price of other liquid bleaches
despite the identical chemical composition of all liquid bleaches and despite the
presence of unused capacity in the industry. 03
P & G was one of the nation's 50 largest manufacturers. In the packaged
detergent field it sold 54.5 per cent of the national total ;104 however, it did not
produce a line of household liquid bleach. In the year of the merger P & G
spent over $80,000,000 on advertising and was the nation's largest adver-
tiser.'05 Before acquiring Clorox it studied its market position carefully and
96. See, e.g., MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 221-67 (1959); Bok,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. lRv.
226, 233-38 (1960); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler.
Kefauver Antinerger Act, 61 COLUmX. L. REv. 629, 651-74 (1961).
97. See Blake & Jones, supra note 94 at 382-84.
98. 3 TADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 16673 (FTC 1963).
99. 3 TRADE REG. REp. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 17161 (FTC 1964).
100. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 98, at 21562.
101. Id. at 21576.
102. Id. at 21563.
103. Ibid.
104. Id. at 21564.
105. Ibid.
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concluded that it would be able to make more effective use of Clorox's adver-
tising budget and that the merger would permit substantial marketing econ-
omies.1o6
In examining these economies, the Federal Trade Commission affirmed a
hearing examiner's findings that substantial discounts are available to the larg-
est users of advertising media.107 P & G, it found, received the maximum
volume discounts on television advertising as well as other media, and the
merger had the effect of making Clorox eligible for the same discounts. For
this reason, P & G could get at least 30 per cent more mileage out of the
Clorox budget than Clorox had previously been able to get. In addition to dis-
count advantages the Commission noted that a large multi-product firm can
sponsor the most popular programs and include commercials for a variety of
its products. As well, a large firm can run commercials for its different prod-
ucts in different sections of the country during a single commercial break.
Clorox thus gained the advantages of network television while limiting its
advertising activity to selected regional markets. The Commission was dubious
as to whether advertising savings in these circumstances could properly be re-
garded as true economies of scale. Rather, it saw them as adding to the bar-
riers to entry and as a threat to competition within the liquid bleach indus-
try.10 8 These were among the reasons for holding the merger illegal under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In the General Foods case, a Commission hearing examiner held the merger
of General Foods and S.O.S., a manufacturer of steel wool, illegal under Sec-
tion 7.109 The examiner found that S.O.S. was one of two dominant steel wool
manufacturers in the U.S. and that it had a yearly advertising budget of near-
Iy $2,000,000. As a result of the merger, S.O.S. was able to take full advan-
tage of network television advertising, a medium which had previously been
closed to it for reasons of cost. General Foods is one of the nation's largest
television advertisers with annual network television advertising time charges
in the neighborhood of $20,000,000. Thus it was able to purchase longer com-
mercial segments at lower net rates and use the S.O.S. budget more "efficient-
ly." After the merger S.O.S. was able to enhance its market share until, in
1963, it accounted for 61 per cent of the steel wool market. In contrast, the
106. Id. at 21565.
107. The findings summarized in this paragraph are discussed id. at 21576-77.
108. Id. at 21584. Subsequent to the FTC proceeding, it has appeared that large
multi-product firms are able to find other uses of the power inherent in the huge adver-
tising budget. In early 1964 Procter & Gamble requested that the National Association
of Broadcasters Code be amended to prohibit "piggy-back" commercials, a term of art
describing one minute commercials for several products of the same manufacturer.
"Piggy-backs" are an effective vehicle for smaller advertisers who cannot afford larger
purchases of network time; thus they are a competitive "answer" to the kind of television
advertising available to the giant manufacturers. This information is contained in a letter
from Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. to Procter & Gamble and the National Association
of Broadcasters, Jan. 16, 1964 (available in the Columbia Law Library).
109. General Foods Corp., supra note 99.
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market share of Brillo, the other leading producer of steel wool, dropped to
37 per cent. 10 The hearing examiner concluded that in the light of the ruling
of the Commission in Procter & Gamble the S.O.S.-General Foods merger
was illegal.
These two cases illustrate the close relation of the discount rate structure of
advertising media in general, and more particularly the discounts available to
users of network television, to merger patterns in consumer goods industries.
For most nondurable consumer goods the ratio of advertising costs to total
costs is high."" A substantial part of the advertising budgets of most large
consumer good manufacturers goes toward television advertising."1 Small
consumer goods manufacturers, effectively prevented from using network tele-
vision, therefore may be at a substantial competitive disadvantage. Firms which
can use television advertising for a number of products on a nation-wide basis
are in the best position to take advantage of most of the rate differentials.
The dimensions of the discount system would appear as well to have a tend-
ency to induce certain kinds of mergers. First, advertisers who market region-
ally are encouraged to merge with other regional marketers, or to merge into
firms already marketing nationally. The merger will give the regional marketer
access to network television by bringing his budget up to the minimum "must
buy" requirement and will permit the combined firm to make use of the entire
network and enjoy the discounts for "line-up" and "station hours." Second,
seasonal goods manufacturers are encouraged to merge with other seasonal
110. The benefits of the General Foods-S.O.S. consolidation must not have escaped
Brillo's attention; in 1963 it merged with Purex Corporation, Ltd., which had experi-
enced the impact of the P & G-Clorox merger.
111. Bain summarizes data for advertising costs in different classes of manufacturing
industries in IDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 389-91 (1962). More detailed breakdowns are
found in FTC, REPORT oN DIsTRIBUTIoN METHODS AND CoSTS, Part V, 5-16 (1944). For
a thorough study of the extreme case of cigarettes, see TENANT, TiE AMERICAN CIGARTrE
INDuSTRY 163-72 (1950). Federal Trade Commission studies indicate that "the largest
firms tend to spend greater absolute amounts on advertising than do their smaller
competitors, but in so doing they bear lighter burdens and reap greater profits," W.
Mueller, "Processor v. Distributor Brands in Food Distribution" in BAum, Tn RonmsoN-
PATmAN Acr 139, 142 (1964). The growing importance of the discount problem is sug-
gested by the fact that between 1947 and 1960 advertising expenditures in the food
marketing industry increased by over 80% as a ratio to net sales. Id at 140.
112. In 1960, for example, 44.6% of the total advertising budget for products cate-
gorized as "soaps and cleansers, drugs and toilet goods" was spent on network televilson
and 32.2% on spot television. Tobacco manufacturers spent 45% of their advertisilg
budgets on network television and 20% on spot television. 33.1% of advertising for prod-
ucts classified as "paper and plastics" was on network television and 16.0% on spot tele-
vision. The reliance on television advertising was almost as great in the "foods and
kindred products," camera and supplies, and home equipment categories. Exceptions to
the pattern of television use are advertising budgets for alcoholic beverages, clothing and
accessories, and tires and rubber products. Automobile manufacturers, although large
users of television advertising, are even larger users of newspaper and magazine space.
Yang, Variations in the Cyclical Behavior of Advertising, 28 J. or MARYMUNG No. 2,
p. 28, Table 3 (April, 1964).
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goods manufacturers who have different peak seasons. The merged firm will
be able to use television on a year-round basis and take advantage of "con-
tinuity" discounts. Third, smaller national multi-product firms are encouraged
to merge with each other to become eligible for larger volume discounts and
to make it economically feasible to "diversify" by advertising on more than
one network or in other media. Such opportunities to "diversify" resulting
from conglomerate mergers inure only to businesses with extremely large ad-
vertising budgets, who can freely use different media without loss of rate dis-
counts.
In sum, the flexibility of network television as an advertising medium in-
creases with the size of the advertising budget and the number of products to
be promoted. A large multi-product advertiser can concentrate all its com-
mercials for a particular product in a single market. Thus, it can keep acquired
companies as regional divisions while giving them all of the advantages of
network television. And it can use its bargaining position to negotiate for the
most attractive time periods and the most effective programs.
Even a cursory examination of the recent history of acquisitions of the firms
with the largest advertising budgets suggest that circumstances such as those
present in the P & G-Clorox and General Foods-S.O.S. mergers are not un-
usual. Of the twenty largest network television advertisers, 18 have purchased
or acquired by merger one or more important new consumer products or
brand names since World War 11.118 Among them they account for at least
seventy-five "product-extension" mergers during that period.
Procter and Gamble, the nation's largest advertiser 114 has, in addition to
Clorox, purchased such brands as Spic n' Span cleaners, Duncan Hines foods,
Ciarmin tissues and Folger coffee in recent years. The P & G acquisition in
1963 of J.A. Folger & Co., sellers of vacuum packed and instant coffees in
western, midwestern and southern, markets, is an interesting e~ample of the
influence of network television advertising in a merger. As a regional distrib-
utor, Folger was a large "spot" advertiser but not a large network advertiser.
With the advantage of P & G's network discount preferences, it is to be ex-
pected that Folger "spot" activity will diminish, since its advertising can now
113. This and information in the following paragraphs is based on the list of the
top 100 network and spot TV advertisers, Advertising Age, April 6, 1964, p. 4, and on
corporation descriptions and history as set out in Standard and Poor Corporations,
Standard Corporation Index. (Hereinafter cited as S&P DEscRninONrs)
114. Among the company's present brand names are the following: Soaps and de-
tergents: Ivory, Camay, Lava, Zest, Tide, Cheer, Dreft, Oxydol, Dash, Duz, Salvo, Joy
Thrill, Downy, Comet, Cascade, Spic & Span, Mr. Clean and Clorox. Food products:
Crisco and Crisco Oil, Big Top peanut butter, Jif peanut butter, Duncan Hines cake
mixes, Fluffo shortening. Toilet goods: Crest, Qleem, Drene, Prell, Head and Shoulders,
Lilt and Secret.
Selected geographic area brands: Stardust bleach, Charmin toilet tissue, Folger coffee,
Top Job and Duncan Hines frostings, S&P DESCRIMtONS, P-S, October-November 1964,
p, 1847,
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be fit less expensively into P & G's many national programs; this will give it
a substantial advertising advantage over other regional brands of coffee.
General Foods Corporation, eighth ranking network television advertiser in
1963,"r, has purchased, in addition to S.O.S., such brands as Kool-Aid, 4-
Seasons, Taffy, Hostess and Acadia Foods. Second ranking American Hone
Products Corporation 116 has acqfiired such brands as Easy-Off oven cleaner,
Dennison Foods, Franklin Foods and Blue-Dew laundry items in recent merg-
ers. Bristol-Myers Company, 117 (third), Lever Brothers, 18 (fifth), R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Company,119 (sixth), Colgate-Palmolive Company,1 0 (seventh)
and Gillette Company 121 (ninth) have all acquired important new brands or
115. General Foods is one of the largest producers and distributors of food and
grocery products. Coffees account for 35% to 40% of the company's sales. Other more
important products are cereals, quick-frozen foods, flour, chocolate and cocoa products
and dessert preparations. Some of General Foods Brand names are Maxwell House, Bliss,
Yuban, Sanka and Maxim coffees. Birds-Eye frozen foods, Post's breakfast cereals,
Baker's chocolate, Jell-O and D-Zerta desserts, Swans Down cake mixes and flours,
Gaines pet foods, S.O.S. soap pads and others such as Log Cabin syrup, Minute Rice
and Good Seasons. S&P DEscRPTos, F-K, August-September 1964, p. 2843.
116. American Home Products Corporation is the second largest domestic manu-
facturer of pharmaceutical, nutritional and vitamin products. It also produces a variety
of proprietary drugs, household specialties, food products, dentifrices and cosmetics.
Among the company's more important brand names are Anacin, BiSoDol, Freezone,
Preparation H, Infra Rub, Dristan, Heet, Aero, Black Flag, 3-in-One oil, IKwik-Lite,
Griffin, Microsheen, Easy-Off, Woolite, Chef Boy-Ar-Dee, Dennison's and Gulden's. S&P
DESCaRITONS, A-B, December-January 1964-65, pp. 9608-09.
117. Bristol-Myers Co. is a leading producer of proprietary drugs, toiletries and allied
products and ethical drugs. Leading brand names include Ipana, Sal Hepatica, Vitalls,
Score, Mum, Ban, Excedrin, Bufferin, Bromo Quinine, 4-Way Cold Tablets, No Doz,
Fitch Dandruff Remover Shampoo, Ammens medicated powder, Lady Clairol, Silk &
Silver, Sparkling Color and Loving Care. S&P DEscIPrIoNS, A-B, June-July 1964, p. 1702.
118. Lever Brothers Co., U.S.A., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Unilever, N.V.,
a Dutch corporation. Unilever, N.V., also owns a 98.8% interest in Thomas J. Lipton,
Inc., a distributor of tea and soup mixes and owner of Good Humor ice cream, Sonic
Lever Brothers brands are All, Breeze, Dove, Lux, Rinso, Lifebuoy, Surf, Swan, Spry,
Wisk; Pepsodent and Stripe toothpastes; Imperial and Good Luck inargarines, S&P
DEscurTIONs, T-Z, October-November 1964, p. 4243.
119. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. is the nation's largest tobacco manufacturer. It
markets under brand names including Camel, Winston, Salem, and Cavalier cigarettes,
Hawaiian Punch, King of the Islands and Cinch fruit juices. S&P DEscRIPrIOs, P-S,
April-May, 1964, p. 2739.
120. Colgate-Palmolive Co. is one of the world's leading producers of toilet and
laundry soaps, packaged detergents, cleansers, air deodorants, dentifrices, shaving prepara-
tions, shampoos and other toilet articles. The company's extensive list of brand names
includes Palmolive, Cashmere Bouquet, Fab, Vel, AD, Ajax, Octagon, Florient air de-
odorant, Wildroot, Code 10, Congestaid, Wash 'n Dri tissues, No Moth and others, S&P
DEscRIPTIONs, C-E, June-July, 1964, p. 3112.
121. The Gillette Co. is the leading producer of safety razors and blades and home
permanent wave kits. The company also produces lather, brushless shaving creams, men's
deodorants, ball point pens, and hospital and medical supplies. Its brand names include
Gillette and Valet razors, Foamy shaving cream, Sun Up after shave lotion, Right Guard
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products through substantial mergers. Of 1963's "big ten" network advertisers
only fourth ranking General Motors Corporation has neither a recent history
of acquisitions in consumer goods lines nor outstanding proposed acquisitions
in such a field.'m
Bristol-Myers Company, consistently one of the top network advertisers
with gross time charges of $31,137,000 and net time (after discounts) plus
program charges of $38,305,300 in 1963,13 has long been active in "product-
extension" mergers, having acquired Minit-Rub, Bristol Laboratories, Am-
mens powders, Luziers cosmetics, Grove proprietary drugs and Clairol products.
In March, 1965, it announced its proposed acquisition of Drackett Company.124
The merger will, if consummated, give Bristol-Myers the distinction of being
the first large advertiser to acquire a firm also among the top one-hundred
network advertisers; Drackett, a manufacturer of household goods, accounted
for $5,211,100 in gross time charges and $6,727,600 in net time plus program-
ming. 25 After the merger, their aggregate gross time charge will be just over
$36 million, almost exactly the same as those incurred in 1963 by American
Home Products Corporation. 2 6 If the new firm does as well in manipulating
discounts as does American Home Products, it will pay the networks only $41.6
million, rather than $45 million, the sum of their present separate payments,
for "after-discount" time and programming. This would indicate a possible
net savings of $3.4 million annually in network advertising costs resulting
from the merger.
The cigarette manufacturers, long near the top of lists of large network ad-
vertisers, are comparatively recent but eager entrants in the merger derby.
Philip Morris, Inc.,'2 was the pathfinder. Long one of the twenty largest net-
work advertisers, Philip Morris diversified into men's toiletry with the acquisi-
tion of A.S.R. Products (Pal, Gem, and Personna razors and blades, Ever-
Ready brushes) in 1960 and Burma-Vita Company (Burma-Shave and other
soaps and cosmetics) in 1963. In the same year, it also acquired Clark Brothers
Chewing Gum Company.
R.J. Reynolds, sixth ranking network advertiser in 1963,12 acquired Pacific-
Hawaiian Products Company in that year, adding canned fruit juices (Hawvai-
ian Punch, King of the Islands, Cinch), and bread and cake mixes to its ad-
deodorant, Toni, Tonette, Silver Curl, Prom, Bobbi, Tame, Adorn, White Rain and
Pamper hair shampoos, Hush deodorant, Deep Magic cleansing lotion and Paper Mate
Pens and refills. S&P DEscIPnIo s, F-K, April-May 1964, p. 3517.
122. See S&P DEscarmiroNs, F-K, August-September 1964, p. 3035.
123. Top 100 Network TV Advertisers in 1963, Advertising Age, April 6, 1964, p. 64.
124. The New York Times, March 20, 1965, p. 31, col. 4.
125. Top 100 Network TV Advertisers in 1963, Advertising Age, April 6, 1964, p. 64.
126. Ibid.
127. Philip forris is the fourth largest domestic cigarette manufacturer. Its brand
names include Marlboro, Parliament, Philip Morris, Alpine, Benson & Hedges, English
Ovals, Paxton, Bond Street, Revelation and Field and Stream. In 1954 the company
acquired Benson & Hedges. S&P DEscR'TIoNs, P-S, April-Mray 1964, p. 2797.
128. Top 100 Netwvork TV Advertisers 1963, Advertising Age, April 6, 1964, p. 64.
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vertising budget. In January 1965, it announced its proposed acquisition of
Penick & Ford, Ltd.,129 owners of College Inn Food Products and Idaho
Potato Starch Company, leading producers of starches, sugars, syrups and
other consumer products under such brand names as My-T-Fine desserts,
Cocomalt drink and Vermont syrup.
Recently, the American Tobacco Company, twelfth ranking network adver-
tiser in 1963, proposed acquisition of Consolidated Foods Corporation, a lead-
ing producer and distributor of food products. If consummated, the acquisi-
tion would have added to American's advertising budget such brands as Sara
Lee, Monarch, Richelieu, Booth, Red Diamond, Union Sugar, Hayden House,
Signet and (temporarily) Gentry. However, when the Federal Trade Com-
mission announced its intention to attack the merger, negotiations ceased,.1 0
Finally, P. Lorillard Company and Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, each
regularly among the twenty-five largest network advertisers, have within the
past year announced the acquisition of, respectively, Usen Canning Company,
a major producer of cat food, and Allen Products Company, maker of Alpo
dog food.13 ' These moves, unlike several of those of their competitors, have
not resulted in action by the antitrust enforcement agencies.
Of the very largest network advertisers, only General Motors and Gillette
have been quiescent in merger activity in recent years. Gillette, however, was
a pioneer. Its acquisition of the Toni Company in 1948 added highly adver-
tised women's hair products (Toni, Prom, Bobbi, Tonette, Silver Curl, Tame,
Adorn, White Rain and Pamper) and cosmetics (Hush deodorant, Deep
Magic lotions) to its shaving lines; in 1955 it acquired Paper Mate pens,
which also then became active in network television.1 3 2 Its merger inactivity
during the last decade may be supposed, as with General Motors, to stem from
an acute case of antitrust sensitivity attributable to the near monopoly market
shares of its main products in recent years.
Merger activity is by no means limited to the top 20 network television
advertisers. Many smaller companies on the list of the top 100 have also been
active.
In February, 1965, Pepsi-Cola Company announced a tentative plan to
merge with Frito-Lay, Inc.,'133 a manufacturer of snack and convenience foods
129. Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1965, p. 2, col. 2. The Justice Department
unsuccessfully requested a preliminary injunction against the acquisition. Wall Street
Journal, May 28, 1965, p. 7, col. 1.
130. Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1965, p. 26, col. 1. A distinctive feature of the pro-
posed American-Consolidated merger was that Consolidated was already the subject of
an antitrust action as the result of its merger activity. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., note 95 supra.
131. S&P DEscRim'loNs, L-Q, February-March 1965, p. 3339; April-May 1965, p. 3103.
132. Gillette has been the traditional sponsor for major sporting events including
the World Series. As the cost of television time and game rights increased, Gillette was
faced with the choice of enlarging its advertising budget through acquisition or losing
a valuable sponsor identification. It chose the merger path.
133. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1965, p. 8, col. 3. For 1963 television advertising
expenditures of these two companies see Advertising Age, April 6, 1964, p. 64.
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including potato chips, pretzels and popcorn, as well as a line of specialty
canned foods including chili, tamales, barbecued beef, spaghetti and meat balls
and party dips. Some of the company's brand names are Fritos, Lay's, Chee-
tos, Ruffles, and several regional labels. In 1963, Pepsi and Frito-Lay had net-
work gross time charges of $2,466,700 and $2,699,900, respectively. Assuming
that both companies continue the same amounts of advertising the combined
total will be $5,166,600. The merger will place the combined company on the
same network discount level as its most important competitor, Coca-Cola,
which had gross time charges of $5,770,000.
The foregoing factual material is far from constituting empirical "proof" of
the proposition that network volume discount practices are the "cause" of ac-
quisitions or mergers by large network televisions advertisers. In the first
place, there has been no systematic demonstration that the rate of such activity
is any higher for that group than for other companies of comparable magni-
tude. Also, even if merger activity were shown to be higher for that group,
it may be that other factors - real economies or other money savings in sales
or distribution of related consumer lines, for example - are common to most
large network television advertisers. Nonetheless, the facts we have noted
rather at random are consistent with what economic analysis would lead one
to expect - that network television volume discounts will have an effect "at
the margin" in the direction of encouraging larger, "balanced" advertising
budgets, through acquisition and merger, as well as in other ways, in industries
in which network television advertising plays a substantial role. Our sugges-
tion is not that network volume discounts are often the central reason for a
merger but that they provide an artificial incentive - unrelated to real econ-
omies and perhaps actually resulting in diseconomies - that may be important
or decisive in an important class of situations.
Barrier to Entry of New Competitors. Not only do advertising discounts
tend to eliminate .ompetition by encouraging mergers in consumer goods in-
dustries, but they also tend to limit the entry of new competitors into these
industries. It is well established that product differentiation and related large
advertising outlays may constitute an important barrier to entry.1m Other
things being equal, large-scale entry into an industry is more difficult than
entry on a smaller scale, as, for example, in a regional market.135 But sub-
stantial advertising discounts, particularly in network television, are avail-
able, as we have shown, only to national concerns with large advertising bud-
gets. A new, undiversified firm thus faces not only a barrier which represents
real economies of scale in advertising (as well as in other aspects of production
and distribution), but will be handicapped by advertising rate structures which
134. BAxN, BAmuRxs TO NEW CoMPETIrrioN 263-317 (1956). Federal Trade Commission
studies lead to the conclusion that: "It seems probable that advertising-created and main-
tained product differentiation constitutes the chief barrier confronting prospective en-
trants in many grocery product industries." XV. Mueller, op. cit. supra note 111, at 142.
The grocery products industries are among the heaviest users of netvork television
advertising.
135. Id. at 53-56, 93-110. See also, Blake & Jones, supra note 76, at 462-63.
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will make its average per unit advertising costs much higher than those of its
large competitors and higher than can be justified by any measure of real costs.
Thus network television discounts are anticompetitive not only in their tend-
ency to encourage consolidation but because they inhibit the normal develop-
ment of new competitive forces in consumer goods industries. They are a
double-barreled menace to the health of competition in those industries which
must rely on network television advertising.
IV. PUBLIC CONTROL OF NETWORK TELEVISION RATE PRACTICES
A. Application of the Antitrust Laws to Network Television Rate Practices
Network discount practices raise at least two important antitrust questions:
whether the discounts constitute price discriminations between customers and
whether they constitute tying arrangements, either of which may be illegal be-
cause of the actual or likely effect on competition in any of several markets.
The legality of discriminatory treatment of customers involves consideration
of three different statutes - the Robinson-Patman Act,110 the Sherman Act 187
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.18  Tying arrangements are similarly
tested by three statutes - the Clayton Act,18 9 the Sherman Act and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.
The Robinson-Patinan Act. The Robinson-Patman Act 140 resulted from the
efforts of small retailers and their traditional "middlemen" suppliers to elini-
nate price concessions large chains often obtained from producers. The statute
was not drawn in these terms, however, and has been applied not only, or even
primarily, to chain store buyers, but much more generally and as an integral
part of national antitrust policy to sellers whose discriminatory pricing prac-
tices threaten to injure competition either with their rivals or between their
customers or purchasers at other distributional levels.
141
136. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (198),
137. 26 Stat 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
138. 38 Stat 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958).
139. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
140. Section 2(a) provides, in relevant part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale with the United States . . . , and
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or pre-
vent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance
for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered....
49 Stat 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
141. See generally, EDWARDs, op. cit. mipra note 54, at 21-65; RowE, PRICE DIscRIMI-
NATION UNDER THE ROBiNSON-PATMAN ACT 3-24, 36-40 (1962, Supp. 1964) ; Adelman, The
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"Volume discounts" are a classic form of price discrimination. In FTC v.
Morton Salt Co.,'2 the Supreme Court upheld the Commission in striking
down a cumulative annual "standard quantity discount" system for the pur-
chase of table salt. Although the discounts were available to all on equal terms,
only five retail chains had purchased in sufficient quantity to earn the maximum
(15.6 per cent) savings. These stores, because of the discounts, were able to
sell at a lower price than their competitors. No further showing of likely injury
to competition is required. Indeed, lower court decisions indicate that a show-
ing of ability to under-sell competitors is not a necessary element of such a
"secondary line" case,143 at least in high turnover, low-margin retail markets. 14"
No showing of loss of business is required since the Robinson-Patman Act
requires only the probability of an injury to competition.
Where the product sold to competitors at discriminatory prices is an "in-
gredient" or component used in the production of an end-product, rather than
itself resold without modification, a greater showing of probable injury to
competition may be required. In Minneapolis-Honeyrwell Regulator Co. v.
FTC, 45 the item was an automatic temperature gauge used by the purchasers
in assembling oil burners. It was the single most expensive element in the
burners, but the discrimination accounted for only some three to eight per cent
of the final price of the burners. Other factors - manufacturing methods, ser-
vice, overhead, distribution and advertising costs - were thought to break any
causal relationship between cost and price. No sufficient likelihood of anticom-
petitive effect could be reasonably inferred.
Although Minneapolis-Honeywell may be an overly narrow reading of Mor-
ton Salt, netAvork volume discounts will often come within even its narrower
formulation. They are systematic, necessarily discriminatory in favor of large
advertisers, and reach percentages much larger than those present in either of
these two cases. For many non-durable consumer goods advertising budgets
are far-and-away the largest cost item. Furthermore, sales of many such prod-
ucts can be shown to vary in almost exact proportion to advertising expo-
Consistency of The Robinson-Patomn Act, 6 STAr. L. Rtv. 3 (1953) ; Adelman, Price Dis-
crimination as Treated in the Attorney Gcneral's Report, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 222 (1955).
The most complete study of the legislative history is in PALAMUNTAuI, THE PoLrrIcs or
DisrmuTroN 188-234 (1955).
142. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
143. In Robinson-Patman Act parlance, a "secondary line!' case is one in which the
injury to competition alleged is in the "line of commerce" in which the buyer competes,
i.e. the competition among retailers selling Morton Salt, or, in the network television
situation, competition between P & G's present Clorox division and its competitors in the
sale of liquid bleach. A "primary line" case alleges injury to competition in the market in
which the seller - the party doing the discriminating - competes, i.e., competition in the
network television "line of commerce."
144. Standard Motor Products, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), affd, 355
U.S. 411 (1958); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963).
145. 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. disnissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
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sure. 46 Thus a firm's ability to compete in the market may be much more
critically affected by discriminatory advertising rates than by comparable per-
centage differences in direct costs of production. In addition, the impact on
competition in the markets in which advertisers compete may go much further,
as we have seen - network practices may tend to injure the competitive struc-
ture of these markets by stimulating mergers and other modes of concentra-
tion.
Not only is price discrimination illegal when competition in the customers'
market is affected, but also when the discrimination threatens to impair com
petition in the seller's market.'47 If, as we have suggested, an important effect
of the discounts is to inhibit entry of new networks or to reinforce the market
position of a stronger network in relation to one which is weaker, or in rela-
tion to other competitive media, they are anticompetitive in "primary line"
markets as well. 14s
None of the important affirmative defenses provided by the Robinson-Pat-
man Act seems applicable to network volume discounts. All the important dis-
counts are cumulative over varying periods of time and none are structured in
such a way that a plausible "cost justification" defense could possibly be
made. 49 And because the rate cards are "systematic," the "good faith meeting
of competition" defense would not apply. One of the few settled principles with
respect-to this defense is that it is available only in cases where the discrimi-
natorily low price is a response to an individual competitive situation rather
than part of a systematic, preconceived pricing policy.
1 0
The only apparent question with respect to applicability cof the Robinson-
Patman Act derives from the fact that that statute bears an imprint of its anti-.
chain store genesis: language describing its application in terms of discrimina-
tion with respect to "commodities... sold for use, consumption or.resale .... ."
Although the dictionary and common usage indicate that a "commodity" in-
cludes "any useful thing... ; anything bought and sold; any article of com-
146. Tennant's study of cigarette marketing concluded that "[a]lthough we cannot
get a precise measure of the advertising elasticity of demand, there can be no serious
doubt that this elasticity is very high and that advertising expenditures are an extremely
effective method of applying market pressure." See TENNANT, THE AMERICAN CIaarrr
INDUsTRY 169 (1950). Procter & Gamble's more recent experience with Comet brand
cleanser is described in Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 98, at 21564. See also Bliven,
Annals of Business: And Now a Word from Our Sponsor, New Yorker, March 23,
1963, p. 83.
147. See discussion in RowE, op. cit. supra note 141, at 141-68, Supp. at 25-32. Rowe's
discussion leans toward a rather restrictive interpretation of the Act's application to
"primary line" situations.
148. See supra note 143.
149. See 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1958); United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); RowE, op. cit. supra note 141,
at 273-96, Supp. at 57-65.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1936); FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945);
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); RowE, op. cit. supra note 141, at 215-55,
Supp. at 44-56.
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merce ... , "15 the Federal Trade Commission early took the position that ad-
vertising space in a periodical was not a "commodity" within the meaning of
the statute 15 2 and a lower Federal court has dismissed a claim of price dis-
crimination on the grounds that radio advertising is not a commodity.10 The
Act's application to television advertising has recently been directly ruled upon.
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Amana Rcfrigeration,154 CBS's suit on a
contract relating to television programs was met with a counterclaim alleging
inter alia that the CBS quantity discounts were in violation of Section 2(a)
of the Act. The court correctly noted that the legislative history was incon-
clusive but held that the context of the term "commodity" in the Act required
the conclusion that it did not refer to "a purchase by Amana of the privilege
of having itself identified as sponsor of the program broadcast and making use
of the permissible portion thereof. for advertising its products."'1*
Amana is unpersuasive precedent because it ignores several interpretative
problems. First, it fails to note that other sections of the Act appear to use the
words "product"' 156 and "goods, wares and merchandise"'u 7 as co-extensive
with "commodity," indicating that any specialized, narrower interpretation of
the latter term was not intended. Rather, familiar and convenient words were
used with no apparent thought of excluding any class of commercial trans-
actions which might contribute to the overriding evil. Of course, at the time of
the legislation television did not exist and national advertising in general had not
yet taken a decisive role as an instrument of competition. Second, the opinion
does not examine carefully the history of the legislation in its Clayton Act 10
context. It is a misinterpretation of the competing interests and considerations
which led to Robinson-Patman's complex provisions to suggest that Congress'
sole concern was to protect the traditional system of small retailer distribution.
The original section 2 of the Clayton Act, of which Robinson-Patman was an
151. WEBSTER'S NEw VoRLD DIcriONARY 295 (Coll. ed. 1959).
152. In an informal, unpublished ruling. See 81 CONG. RE.. ApP. 233641 (1937)
(remarks of Representative Patman), cited in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 n.27 (1953).
153. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 32 F.R.D. 29 (1962), aff'd on other
grounds, 319 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1963).
154. 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1961).
155. 295 F.2d 375, 378. Another case has held that a lease of real estate does not
fall within the "commodity" confines of § 2(a). See Gaylord Shops v. Pittsburgh Miracle
Mile Town & Crhntry Shopping Center, 219 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Penna. 1953).
156. Section 2(d).
157. Section 2(c). Rep. Celler has commented on the difficulty, in principle, of dis-
tinguishing between the sale of commodities and non-commodities in this context. See
Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcasting Industry, 22 LAw & CoNrTzEr.
PRoB. 549, 569-70 (1957).
158. 38 Stat 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). For further criticism of Amana
see Loevinger, The Role of Government it the Field of Advertising, 26 A.B.A. AN urrrsr
SEcrioN 180, 181-82 (Aug. 1964).
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adaptation, was a response to uses of price discrimination through which
smaller businesses of all sorts - including local and regional producers -
were forced into consolidations with larger organizations. These considerations
were not lost sight of in the legislative negotiations which preceded the Robin-
son-Patman Act. 59 Indeed, the main effect of the "primary line" injury pro-
vision is the protection of competition in producers' markets. These arguments
were not carefully developed either in petitioner's briefs before the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit or in support of certiorari.
Finally, Anmana is less than definitive because it was one of that unfortu-
nate and disfavored class of cases in which a defendant in a suit for monies
due on an executed contract seeks to convert the focus of the suit from simple
adequacy of contractual performance to a complex antitrust issue of far-reach-
ing consequences. Here, the original contract dispute was over $32,114.17,
which Amana by counterclaim converted into a $9 million treble damage ac-
tion. At that point, of course, the Tiffanies of the Wall Street and Washington
antitrust bar were brought in by CBS, and they earned their fees well by re-
minding the courts that this was an inappropriate context in which to decide
the fate of the rate structures of not only the television industry, but of radio
and the newspaper and magazine industries as well. After all, very large mat-
ters were involved and this litigation could hardly provide the kind of infor-
mation with respect to industry structure and economic effects which would
presumably play a part in any Government antitrust proceeding. One may
suppose that the courts were right in preferring to wait for a full-dress occa-
sion. Commendable judicial caution, however, should not be regarded as now
foreclosing a thoroughgoing examination of the fundamental issues involved.
It has been suggested that the requirement that the commodities involved be
"of like grade and quality" also effectively prevents application of the Robin-
son-Patman Act to sales of television time.160 The argument is that no two
television programs are the same or reach the same audiences. But the dis-
counts apply only to purchases of network time. The basic rate depends on
which time category - class "A" or other - is purchased and what stations
are taken. Each station's class "A" hourly rate is based onl the number of tele-
vision homes within the station's reception area.101 If the rate making process
is a fair one - and it is subject to FTC surveillance - any dollar's worth of
station time should be as nearly equivalent to any other dollar's worth as
careful negotiation can make it.162 The "like grade and quality" requirement
159. See, e.g., EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 54, at 31-33. Congressman Patman later
expressed the view, however, that the statute was not intended to apply to "magazine
or other advertising space." PArMAN, THE RoBINsoN-PAT Ar Acr 75 (1938). This work,
in spite of its impressive authorship, is necessarily somewhat less than definitive on matters
of Congressional intent.
160. Section 2(a).
161. See NmvWoR BRADCASTING at 415; see generally 408-20.
162. The Amana court agreed:
Although no two programs present the same artistic, educational or entertain-
ment value to all persons it may well be that so-called prime time programs which
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is not held to demand fungible products, or that nondiscriminatory prices be
identical. Indeed, to reduce the price of a "premium" product to that of a
"regular" product may give rise to an unlawful price discrimination. I'3
One problem, of course, in any departure from a narrow interpretation is
that the Robinson-Patman Act presents both policy and technical difficulties
in some applications. If the scope of "commodities" extends beyond retailers'
stocks and physical components, lines presumably should be drawn somewhere
this side of consumer and business services. But an appropriate decision in
one case should not be withheld in the fear that courts in future cases will not
be able to make equally appropriate distinctions. There is no special conceptual
or other difficulty in applying the Act to advertising time and space, scarce
commodities created solely to impart added values to other economic goods.
The very limited precedent which goes in the other direction is not so well
reasoned as to be persuasive.1
64
Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Turning to the "tying" effects of the networks'
discount arrangements, Section 3 of the Clayton Act 1015 must be considered.
Section 3's usual application to tying arrangements has been in cases where
the lease of a machine has been conditioned on the lessee's agreeing to buy
supplies for the machine from the lessor. In the broadest sense these arrange-
ments create a situation in which products do not compete on their own
merits.166 A violation of Section 3 requires only that "the seller enjoys a mo-
nopolistic position in the market for the 'tying' product, or [that] ... a sub-
stantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained."16 7 The "sub-
have demonstrated comparable audience drawing power would be of like grade
and quality from a commercial standpoint to prospective sponsor-advertisers.
(Dictum)
295 F.2d 375, 378.
163. See RowE, op. cit. supra note 141, at 65-76, Supp. at 9-11; FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
164. If the discriminations are illegal under § 2(a), the enforcement agencies would,
of course, also be able to proceed against the advertisers who "knowingly .. .induce or
receive" the discrimination, under § 2(f) of the Act. See, generally, RowE, op. cd. supra
note 141, at 428-51, Supp. at 98-111.
165. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Section 3 provides, in relevant part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, %ares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or un-
patented, for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , or fix a price
charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or
deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such
lease, sales, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.
166. See discussion in Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimcnsional Anlitrust Policy,
65 CoLum. L. REv. 422, 433-36 (1965).
167. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603-09 (1953).
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stantial volume" requirement may be satisfied by a relatively small dollar
amount and does not require a "market share" analysis.108
The network tie-ins are somewhat out of the ordinary in that they are not
"absolute" requirements - rather, they merely give a substantial preference
on prime time or other network time rates to purchasers who also take mar-
ginal time or stations. Section 3, however, specifically encompasses this varia-
tion; it defines the prohibited act: ".... to lease or make a sale ... , or fix a
price ... or discount from, or rebate upon, such price . . . ."16 And the first
Supreme Court case applying this section to tying arrangements involved,
among other kinds, comparable "tie-in discounts." 170
The effects of the networks' tie-in discounts are precisely those which Sec-
tion 3 seeks to prevent. In a recent opinion striking down a tying arrange-
ment,171 the Supreme Court noted that they (1) "deny competitors free access
to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying
requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of his power or
leverage in another market," and (2) produce the result that "buyers are
forced to forego their free choice between competing products." 172 The net-
work discounts clearly tend to force most advertisers who buy winter season
prime evening time on one network to "forego" buying afternoon or summer
time from another network or, indeed, from spreading around their network
time purchases in any category. They correspondingly tend to restrain com-
petition by foreclosing actual and potential competitors from selling in those
highly competitive submarkets. They may have an additional anticompetitive
effect of a type that has to date not been discussed in the cases. By inhibiting
the increase of prime evening time rates to levels the market would apparently
bear in the absence of these gimmicks, they may serve to discourage the entry
of new network or network-type competition and of VHF and other stations
competitive with network affiliates. 173 This reinforces positions of market
power held by the networks and their affiliated stations.
However, the word "commodity" appears again at the crucial moment in
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, as it does in the Robinson-Patman provisions.
The Section 3 usage, however, dates back to passage of the Clayton Act in
1914, without the intervention of any amendatory revision such as that
wrought by the Robinson-Patman Act. Thus it is even more difficult to ex-
plain why a statute whose purpose was to buttress the Sherman Act, by strik-
ing down specific practices thought to be peculiarly harmful, should be given
163. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307-14 (1949); Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
169. Supra note 165. (Emphasis added.)
170. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). The same
case established that there need be no specific agreement not to use the products of a
competitor where the "practical effect" is to inhibit such use. Id. at 457.
171. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
172. Id. at 6.
173. See text supra at note 81.
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a much narrower scope of effectiveness with respect to the very practice they
outlaw. Yet a District Court opinion' 74 refused to apply Section 3 to a tie-in
which obligated a mortgagor to buy insurance required by the mortgage from
the lender, in part because neither "lease," "sale" nor "contract for sale"
seemed to describe a mortgage or loan agreement. That court applied the
statutory canon of ejusdem generis to limit the meaning of statutory language,
rather than approach the statute from the view of legislative purpose. The
court could not conceive of money as a commodity which is bought and sold,
for a price, in the marketplace. 7 5 Perhaps because of this case and the less-
than-overwhelming Robinson-Patman precedent noted earlier, the Department
of Justice chose to bring its attack against morning-evening newspaper "unit"
advertising contracts, essentially "tie-ins," under the Sherman Act, which con-
tains no "commodity" term, rather than under Section 3. In its opinion in that
case, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,'" the Supreme Court
noted the Government's reluctance but expressed no opinion on the issue.1'
The most persuasive argument against the broader interpretation of "com-
modities" in Robinson-Patman cases - that the Act presents great problems
both as to its policy and administration - has no comparable force in respect
of tying arrangements under Section 3. Such arrangements are comparatively
rare and of lesser general economic importance than volume discounts. Al-
though the Supreme Court may be guilty of hyperbole in asserting that "tying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion,"'178 it can hardly be urged that important economies would often be lost
by applying to them the strictest antitrust standards ;17O on behalf of price dis-
crimination, on the other hand, it is persuasively urged that in its less sys-
tematic forms it may promote the breakdown of otherwise rigidly uniform in-
dustry price structuresY80
The Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 18i presents no "com-
modity" problem; it applies to restraints whose effects are felt in interstate
commerce with respect to all goods and services. Furthermore, the Sherman
Act's reach extends to both price discrimination and tying arrangements. Thus
the "quantity discount" and "tying" effects of the networks' rate practices
would both be relevant in a Sherman Act proceeding.
The problems in moving under the Sherman Act are (1) that a somewhat
higher standard of proof of anticompetitive effect might possibly be required,
174. United States v. Investors Diversified Services, 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951).
175. Id. at 647-48.
176. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
177. Id. at 609, especially n.27.
178. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
179. See Blake & Jones, supra note 166, at 439, n.64.
180. See, e.g., EVARDS, op. cit. supra note 54, at 620-21.
181. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Section 1 provides, in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or othervise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce... is hereby declared to be illegal. ....
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at least in the price discrimination aspects of the case, (2) that if the "quantity
discount" and "tying" effects are thought to be sufficiently "mixed" with other
commercial objectives, a "rule of reason" approach would open the doors to
elaborate industry testimony, in justification of the system, which would be
difficult to evaluate, and (3) that although the Supreme Court has subse-
quently taken a quite different approach to "tying" problems under the Sher-
man Act, the Times-Picayune case has never been explicitly repudiated and is
arguably closer on its facts to the "tying" aspects of network discounts than
more recent decisions.
None of these problems seems insurmountable. The greater showing of anti-
competitive injury which the Sherman Act has required may be largely a thing
of the past. The Supreme Court's most recent Sherman Act decisions reflect
a strong tendency to assimilate the "stricter" Clayton Act standards into the
Sherman Act. 8 2 In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,18 for example,
the Government attacked Northern Pacific's "preferential routing" clauses
which required all those who bought or leased land from it to ship all com-
modities produced or manufactured on the land over its lines, provided that its
rates and service were equal to those of competing carriers. The action was
brought under the Sherman Act, perhaps in part to avoid the "commodities"
issue. The Court held that tying agreements
,.. are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain
free competition in the market for the tied product and a "not insubstan-
tial" amount of interstate commerce is affected.
84
Northern Pacific's large landholdings were regarded "beyond any genuine
question" as satisfying the "economic power" requirement. Whenever the con-
trol of the tying product constitutes "an effectual weapon to pressure buyers
into taking the tied item,"' 185 the Sherman Act may appropriately be applied.
Thus it is difficult to see that any practical difference now remains between
Clayton and Sherman Act standards in this area.
Neither does the "rule of reason" concern with appropriate commercial ob-
jectives seem likely ultimately to exonerate the network practices. The Court
noted in Northern Pacific that "such nonanticompetitive purposes as these
arrangements have been asserted to possess can be adequately accomplished by
other means much less inimical to competition."' 88
182. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964)
(mergers) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements);
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953) (exclusive arrange-
ments).
183. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
184. Id. at 6.
185. Ibid.
186. Id. at 6, n.5. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1962) leaves open
the possibility that in "rare circumstances" the doctrine may be "inapplicable." To recon-
cile this statement-with Northern Pacific, one must assume that some facts will result
in an arrangement having "tying" effects not being treated as a tie-in. This may be the
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Perhaps the only possibility of avoiding the strictness of the rule is the
argument that the arrangements cannot appropriately be characterized as "ty-
ing arrangements." In Times-Picayune the Court was persuaded that adver-
tising space in the evening paper and the morning paper, under single owner-
ship and control, were not in fact regarded by advertisers as "separate and dis-
tinct products" to which the tying analogy could be properly applied. 8 T There
was no evidence that "advertisers bought space motivated by considerations
other than customer coverage; that their media selections, in effect, rested on
generic qualities differentiating morning from evening readers in New Or-
leans." The two readerships were the "selfsame 'product.'"188
The same problem was presented, and resolved in the opposite way, in the
more recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Loew's, Inc., 80 where
the defendants were held to have violated the Sherman Act in "block-booking"
feature motion pictures in selling or licensing them for television exhibition.
In answering the complaint that "successful pressure [was] applied to tele-
vision station customers to accept inferior films along with desirable pic-
tures,"''10 defendants argued that the films were "reasonably interchangeable"
in television programming and that therefore block-booking and tying analysis
was inappropriate. 191 This approach was unsuccessful. The Court also firmly
denied the appropriateness of giving weight to one defendant's "rule of reason"
argument - the business justification that it had secured financing only by
agreeing to require purchasers to show a minimum number of its guarantor's
spot commercials, thus necessitating large block sales. Citing Northern Pacific,
the Court held that "tying arrangements, once found to exist in a context of
sufficient economic power, are illegal 'without elaborate inquiry as to . .. the
business excuse for their use.' "1192
Characterizing the networks' discount practices as tying arrangements does
not present the difficulties encountered by the Court in Tines-Picayune. Even
assuming the Court there had sound bases for treating readership of the morn-
ing and evening papers as homogeneous, which seems doubtful, network tie-ins
are of much more distinct products. Evening and afternoon viewers of tele-
vision, for example, constitute a substantially different market, as do viewers
case where there is no other way to protect good will, International Business Machines
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936) (dictum), or to moderate risks in in-
troducing highly technical new products. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curian, 365 U.S. 567, rehearing denied, 365 U.S.
890 (1961). The tying arrangement employed by Jerrold Electronics (which survived the
above-mentioned litigation) has subsequently been found illegal. See Jerrold Electronics
Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F2d 653 (9th Cir. 1965).
187. 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953).
188. Ibid.
189. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
190. Id. at 40.
191. Brief for Appellant C & C Super Corp., pp. 38-39, United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
192. 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1962).
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in New York and in Dubuque. Furthermore, the morning and evening papers
effected critical economies by leaving ad materials intact in page layouts from
morning to evening editions. Network time tie-ins have no comparable claim
to achieving economic efficiency.
Although price discrimination is less often dealt with under the Sherman
Act, the Supreme Court has made it clear that contracts resulting in an "un-
reasonable discrimination" are condemned as Sherman Act restraints. In
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,193 defendant motion picture pro-
ducers and distributors had "discriminated against small independent exhib-
itors and in favor of large affiliated and unaffiliated circuits" through contract
provisions, involving levels of rentals and other privileges. The "competitive
advantages of these provisions [to the exhibitors] were so great . . . [as to
constitute] an unreasonable discrimination. . .. ,,194 The Paramount case in-
volved joint activity among competitors, although the court did not couch its
discussion in those terms. In United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea
Co.,'0 5 however, the Sherman Act was invoked against price discrimination in
a situation in which no cartel features were present. The competitive advan-
tage accruing to A & P from the price discriminations it obtained from its
suppliers was held to be "an unlawful restraint in itself" under the Sherman
Act, regardless of whether A & P was "in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act,"' 96 even though no group action among the discriminators was alleged.
It seems clear that price discrimination, like tying arrangements, may be illegal
under the Sherman Act, regardless of Clayton Act limitations.
The Federal Trade Commission Act. Adopted in 1914 as a sister statute
to the original Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act "0T is at once
the least specific and the most all-embracing of the antitrust laws. Although its
early interpretation was restrictive,0 8 its proscription of "unfair methods of
competition" has now been held by the Supreme Court to encompass not only
acts condemned by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but further "to stop in
their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those
Acts .... "199 "Congress advisedly left the concept [unfair methods of competi-
tion] flexible to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the
field of business.
'200
193. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
194. Id. at 159-60.
195. 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
196. Id. at 88.
197. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958).
Section 5 provides that:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
198. E.g., FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
199. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
See also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1948).
200. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., supra note 199, at 394,
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The effect of Section 5 of the Act on a practice with tying and discrimina-
tory effects - both strongly suspect in their "pure" forms under the Sherman
Act - would be, certainly, strongly to encourage judicial support of a Com-
mission finding that such a practice constitutes an "unfair method of competi-
tion." This result should be forthcoming even though the court might believe,
under a "rule of reason" test, that the anticompetitive effects were outweighed
by justifiable commercial considerations. This is because the statute adds the
"incipiency" element to already strict Sherman Act substantive standards.
Another effect of Section 5 is that, in addition to carrying stricter standards,
it fills certain loopholes. In this function, it overcomes any limiting effect of a
restrictive interpretation of the word "commodities" as it appears in the Rob-
inson-Patman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The leading case for this
proposition is Grand Union Co. v. FTC,20' which also involved Section 2(d)
of Robinson-Patman. That section prohibits the making of payments for sales
services or facilities unless "proportionally" available to all customers. It ap-
plies only to sellers. Another section of the Act, 2(f), prohibits a buyer from
knowingly inducing or receiving a discrimination in. price. In Grand Union
the buyer induced and received a non-proportioned payment for use of a
facility. To avoid a defense grounded on a narrow interpretation of the term
"price" the Commission proceeded against the buyer under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and its cease and desist order was upheld.2-"
Subsequent similar orders prohibiting buyers from taking payments which
would be illegal for a seller to grant under Sections 2(c) or 2(d) have also
been upheld2
0 3
The Court of Appeals opinion in Grand Union noted that the transaction
involved was dearly illegal under Robinson-Patman. In effect, all the Com-
mission had done was to use Section 5 to expand technical "jurisdiction" to
include the buyer as well as the seller; this was a simple administrative ex-
pedient. No inference could arise from the statute that somehow buyers, al-
though not sellers, were intended to be permitted to engage in transactions of
this type. This argument, of course, would not be available for a use of Section
5 to extend the Robinson-Patman net beyond the "commodities" limitation;
such an application would make illegal transactions now excluded, if only by
scant precedent.
But the Court of Appeals in Grand Union limited its holding more narrow-
ly than necessary. In FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,204 the
Commission had proceeded against respondent, a producer and distributor of
advertising motion pictures, who had used "exclusive supply contracts" with
201. 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
202. Ibid.
203. FTC v. 3. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denicd, 380 U.S.
908 (1965); K. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food Inc. v.
FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
204. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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movie exhibitors, the effect of which had been to foreclose competitors from
access to their exhibiting facilities. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which is the
only provision of the antitrust laws which deals explicitly with "exclusives,"
does not apply to such an arrangement because it is directed only against sellers
or lessors. The facts also raised a very similar "commodity" question, because
what respondent was buying was advertising time on exhibitors' screens. If the
Clayton Act's real and supposed limitations of coverage defined the outer limits
of the law, the transaction would have been beyond reach. The argument was
made by respondent 20 5 but not treated by the Court, which held that the
arrangement's foreclosing effects brought it "within the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act and [it] is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' within
the meaning of Section 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act."20 The
Court has made it clear on other occasions that applicability of Section 5 does
not turn on the niceties of statutory expression but on whether "purpose and
practice . . . runs counter to the public policy declared in the Sherman and
Clayton Acts .... -2o7 For example, Section 3 of the Clayton Act was used
by the Court as a source of public policy supporting the FTC's action under
Section 5 against the "group boycott" plan which a trade association adopted
to combat "style piracy" - this even though the association itself and many
of its members were not sellers of any product and those most directly affected
by the boycott were not "purchasers," a statutory term.
208
Two recent Federal Trade Commission decisions confirm the view of that
agency that Section 5 is not limited in its reach by possible narrow interpreta-
tions of Clayton Act terminology. In Grand Caillou Packing Co., 20 it struck
down rental discrimination in leases to canners of patented shrimp deveining
machinery. The equipment was leased to Gulf Coast packers at one rate and
West Coast competitors at a higher rate. The Commission applied Robinson-
Patman policy in invoking Section 5 even though the relevant section of the
anti-price-discrimination statute applies only to "purchases" and "purchasers,"
not to lessees.2 10 Dissenting Commissioner Elman noted that "unfair practices
in conflict with the policy of the Robinson-Patman Act may be suppressed
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in a case where, as here,
the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable for jurisdictional reasons.
The basis of his dissent was doubt that discrimination was present, at least in
the sense of the central concern of the Robinson-Patman Act, favoring large
buyers at the expense of their competitors.
205. Brief for Respondents, pp. 55-60, FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service
Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
206. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953).
207. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
208. Id. at 464.
209. 3 TRAD. REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 1 16927 (FTC 1964).
210. RowE, op. cit. supra note 141, at 51-53, Supp. at 130.
211. Grand Caillou Packing Co., 3 TADE REr. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
1f 16927, p. 21992 (FTC 1964).
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Even more recently, in Beatrice Foods Co.,212 the Commission held that
Section 5 was appropriately applied to acquisitions of non-corporate firms -
personal proprietorships and partnerships - although Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act applies only to acquisition of corporate shares or assets. Its opinion
noted:
Had Congress deliberately limited Section 7 to corporations, determin-
ing that acquisitions involving persons and partnerships should not be
governed by the same standards applicable to corporate acquisitions, we
would hesitate to conclude that such acquisitions are to be tested in Section
5 proceedings under Section 7 standards. But no such Congressional in-
tent is discernible. So far as appears, Section 7 was not made applicable to
noncorporate acquisitions only because corporate acquisitions were in the
forefront of Congressional concern and attention....
It is well established that Section 5 reaches transactions which violate
the standards of the Clayton Act though for technical reasons are not sub-
ject to that Act, unless such application of Section 5 would be an attempt
to "supply what Congress has studiously omitted" [citing FTC v. Sim-
plicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959) ] or to "circumvent the essen-
tial criteria of illegality prescribed by the express prohibitions of the Clay-
ton Act." [citing Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws, p. 149, n. 78 (1955) and Grand Union Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962) ] Applying Section 5 to noncorporate acquisi-
tions effectuates, rather than circumvents or conflicts with, Congress'
policy with respect to the prevention of anticompetitive acquisitions."13
The Supreme Court's most recent antitrust decision approves the view of
the Commission, in a case in which it had applied Section 5 to business prac-
tices whose effect was the same as that of tying arrangements but which did
not specifically fall within the terms of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. In
Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,'1 4 the oil company had agreed to and had
"sponsored" the sale of tires, batteries and accessory products of the Good-
year Tire and Rubber Company to its wholesale and retail outlets. It received
a percentage commission in return for "promoting" such sales and "assisting"
dealers in resale of the goods. The Commission not only enjoined the use of
"direct methods of coercion" by Atlantic on its dealers, which phase of the
case was not brought to the Court for review, but also prohibited the respond-
ents from entering into any such commission arrangements. -15 The Court
noted that the contract is "not a tying arrangement" nor does it "expressly
require [purchases of Goodyear products] from its dealers."210 However, the
"central competitive characteristic" was the same - "the utilization of eco-
nomic power in one market to curtail competition in another."2 1 7 Because the
Commission was warranted in finding "that the effect of the plan was as though
212. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17244 (FTC 1965).
213. Id. at 22335-336.
214. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
215. 33 U.S.L. VEEx 4507.
216. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 4507, 4510.
217. Ibid.
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Atlantic had agreed 'with Goodyear to require its dealers to buy Goodyear
products and had done so,"'218 the arrangement, having a "not insubstantial"
effect on commerce, was illegal. The Court observed:
As our cases hold, all that is necessary in section 5 proceedings to find
a violation is to discover conduct that "runs counter to the public policy
declared in the Act." But this is of necessity, and was intended to be, a
standard to which the Commission would give substance. In doing so, its
use as a guideline of recognized violations of the antitrust laws was, we
believe, entirely appropriate. It has long been recognized that there are
many unfair methods of competition that do not assume the proportions
of antitrust violations [citing Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,
344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953)]. When conduct does bear the characteristics
of recognized antitrust violations it becomes suspect, and the Commis-
sion may properly look to cases applying those laws for guidance.
Although the Commission relied on such cases here, it expressly re-
jected a mechanical application of the law of tying arrangements. 210
The Court also rejected contentions that the Commission should have ap-
plied a "rule of reason" analysis to the economics of the marketing arrange-
ment:
But just as the effect of this plan is similar to that of a tie-in, so it is
unnecessary to embark upon a full-scale economic analysis of competitive
effect.... [I]t is enough that the Commission found that a not insubstan-
tial portion of commerce is affected [citing United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962) and International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947) ].220
Thus, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act both subsumes Sher-
man Act restraints, extending illegality to their merely "incipient" effects, and
perfects the basic policy of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, by giving
the Federal Trade Commission power to "hit at every trade practice, then
existing or thereafter contrived, which restrain[s] competiton .... " 21 It seems
218. Ibid.
219. Ibid. A different view was taken by the Eighth Circuit in deciding that the Com-
mission had not appropriately applied Section 5 to a case involving Brown Shoe Com-
pany's "franchise store program." Brown had furnished significant merchandising, in-
surance, and accounting assistance to retailers who "concentrate" on Brown's lines of
shoes, the franchise agreements containing a provision that the retailer shall have "no
lines conflicting with Brown division brands . . ." The Court of Appeals reasoned that
the plans were neither "opposed to good morals" nor constituted tying or exclusive dealing
arrangements that violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts; therefore, Section 5 was
inappropriately invoked. See Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964). In
seeking certiorari to the Supreme Court, the U.S. Solicitor General's petition urges
that the Commission is not bound "by traditional concepts of commercial morality or
the relatively specific criteria of the Sherman and Clayton Acts." BNA A & TRADE RE0.
REP., May 11, 1965, p. A-10.
220. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 4507, 4510. See also R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445
(2d Cir. 1964), applying Section 5 to practices not clearly within the confines of § 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.
221. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
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clear that discriminatory network rate practices should not be, and were not
intended to be, immunized from its purview because of a narrow interpretation
of a subsidiary word in one of Congress' three relevant enactments.
B. The Regulatory Role of the Federal Communications Commission
The Communications Act of 1934 222 gives the Federal Communications
Commission the responsibility and authority, in the "public interest, conven-
ience or necessity," to regulate "radio stations engaged in chain broadcast-
ing."22 Although the Act does not expressly authorize the Commission to
make rules and regulations directly applicable to networks, it has successfully
exercised surveillance over a variety of network practices through its control
over the issuance, renewal and revocation of individual station licenses, includ-
ing those of stations owned by the networks.
However, an important feature of the Act's philosophy is "that broadcasters
are not common carriers and are not to be dealt with as such,"224 and "thus
the Commission is given no supervisory control of the programs, of business
management or of policy."225 The Communications Act, as viewed by the Su-
preme Court in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,= G0 enunciates a basic
regulatory theme: the public interest requires a fully developed broadcast in-
dustry which offers listeners a wide variety of high-quality programs; the
Commission is the guardian of that public interest; competition within an
ordered broadcast spectrum is to be its regulatory tool. The Court noted:
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against
competition but to protect the public. Congress intended to leave competi-
tion in the business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee
who was not interfering electrically with other broadcasters to survive or
succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive to the
public. 2 7
Thus the assumption is that increasing the number of broadcast signals in
a community and the number of available program sources will enable com-
petitive forces to satisfy the program objectives. -- In part because of technical
limitations, the theory has never been fully tried, and the Commission has re-
sorted to a degree of "public utility" type of regulation of station licensees.
There is surveillance of stations' programming to ascertain if it is "bal-
anced." Licensees must give all significant groups reasonable access to the
222. 48 Stat 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
223. 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1958).
224. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
225. Id. at 475.
226. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
227. Id. at 475.
228. Levin, Federal Control & Entry in the Broadcast Indtstry, 5 J. L. & Ecori.
49,51 (1962).
229. FCC Interim Report on Responsibility for Broadcast Matter A S-A 12 (1960).
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airwaves. 230 Programming "in the public interest" is expected even at the
sacrifice of maximum profits.
231
In 1941 the Commission noted in its exhaustive Report on Chain Broadcast-
ing that:
*. . [T]he fact that the chain broadcasting method brings benefits and
advantages to both the listening public and to broadcast station licensees
does not mean that the prevailing practices and policies of the networks
and their outlets are sound in all respects, or that they should not be
altered. The Commission's duty under the Communications Act of 1934
is not only to see that the public receives the advantages and benefits of
chain broadcasting, but also, so far as its powers enable it, to see that
practices which adversely affect the ability of licensees to operate in the
public interest are eliminated.
232
The Commission found eight network practices to be detrimental to the public
interest and amenable to its regulation. It announced Regulations addressed
to station licensees providing, generally, that no licenses, including renewal
applications, would be granted to stations or applicants having specified re-
lationships with networks. The network "abuses" were: (1) provisions in net-
work affiliation agreements which prevented the station from broadcasting the
programs of any other network (Regulation 3.101) ;233 (2) provisions which
bound the network not to sell programs to any other station in the affiliate's
area even after rejection of a program by the affiliate (Regulation 3.102) ;234
(3) five-year terms of affiliation (Regulation 3.103) ;2 (4) "option time"
provisions giving the network overly great control over licensee's programming
(Regulation 3.104) ;236 (5) provisions unduly limiting the freedom of licensees
to reject network programs (Regulation 3.105) ;237 (6) network ownership
of more than one station in the same area or of any station in areas where the
available facilities "are so few or of such unequal desirability . . . that com-
petition would be substantially restrained by such licensing" (Regulation
3.106) ;288 (7) a "network organization" maintaining more than one network
(Regulation 3.107) ;239 and (8) provisions preventing or hindering a station
from fixing or altering its rates for the sale of time for other than the net-
work's programs (Regulation 3.108).240
230. Ibid; FCC, Public Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees 39-40 (1946) ; S. 3171,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. and S. RP. No. 1539, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See also Editorial-
izing by Broadcast Licensees, 1 P.&F.R.R. 91:201 (FCC 1949).
231. Levin, op. cit. supra note 228, at 51, 58 n.21.
232. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 4 (1941).
233. 47 C.F.R. § 73.131 (1965).
234. 47 C.F.R. § 73.132 (1965).
235. 47 C.F.R. § 73.133 (1965).
236. 47 C.F.R. § 73.134 (1965).
237. 47 C.F.R. § 73.135 (1965).
238. 47 C.F.R. § 73.136 (1965).
239. 47 C.F.R. § 73.137 (1965).
240. 47 C.F.R. § 73.138 (1965).
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In promulgating the Regulations the Commission observed that:
The net effect [of the practices disclosed by the investigation] has been
that broadcasting service has been maintained at a level below that pos-
sible under a system of free competition .... 241
A consideration cited by the Commission as supporting several of the Regula-
tions was that an effect of the challenged practice was "to hinder the growth
of new networks" or to "deprive the public of the improved service it might
otherwise derive from competition in the network field." The Commission also
noted that:
... although not charged with the duty of enforcing [the Sherman Act,
the Commission] should administer its regulatory powers ... in the light
of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve. 24
In upholding the Commission's authority to exercise the power asserted by
the Chain Broadcasting Regulations, the Supreme Court, in its opinion in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,2 43 agreed that:
... [T]he Commission was entitled to find that the large public aims of
the Communications Act of 1934 comprehend the considerations which
moved the Commission in promulgating the Chain Broadcasting Regula-
tions. True enough, the Act does not explicitly say that the Commission
shall have power to deal with network practices found inimical to the pub-
lic interest. But ... "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread
fear that in the absence of governmental control the public interest might
be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field" [Cit-
ing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940)]. In
the context of the developing problems to which it was directed, the Act
gave the Commission not niggardly but expansive powers. It was given
a comprehensive mandate to "encourage the larger and more effective use
of radio in the public interest," if need be, by making "special regulations
applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting."
2 4"
Section 313 of the Communications Act authorizes the Commission to withhold
licenses from persons convicted of having violated the antitrust laws.-4 To the
networks' contention that "this provision puts considerations relating to com-
petition outside the Commission's concern before an applicant has been con-
victed of monopoly or other restraints of trade," the Court replied that Con-
gress could "hardly be deemed to have limited the concept of 'public interest'
so as to exclude all considerations relating to monopoly and unreasonable re-
straints upon commerce."' ' 6 Nor had the Commission acted ultra vires in ex-
plicitly taking antitrust objectives into account in applying statutory standards.
In considering whether the NBC case provides specific precedent for Com-
mission action with respect to network volume discount practices it must be
241. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 82 (1941).
242. Id. at 46.
243. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
244. Id. at 218-19.
245. 48 Stat 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1958).
246. 319 U.S. 190, 222-23 (1943).
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noted, however, that all but two of the Regulations applied to and prohibited
specific restrictions in affiliation contracts. The two exceptions were Regula-
tion 3.106,247 which simply announced an ownership restriction which would
be followed in granting station licenses, and Regulation 3.107,248 prohibiting
affiliation with a network organization maintaining more than one network,
which had been suspended by the Commission and was not considered by the
Court.2 9 Thus none of the Regulations considered by the Court were directed
against network practices not directly reflected in the contractual relationship
between networks and licensees.
Network discount structures have a direct impact on network affiliate nego-
tiations and agreements. Although network discounts are subtracted from the
network's share of time sales proceeds and do not directly affect station com-
pensation, an effect of the discounts is to encourage the purchase of broadcast
time on stations in large markets which have high network hourly rates. Thus
they provide the networks with bargaining power in seeking to attract affiliates
in large markets with too few stations to provide an affiliate for each network,
They also favor large stations over small stations.
Recent Commission action with respect to different problems in network-
affiliate relationships demonstrate its continuing concern with anticompetitive
effects of the kinds inherent in volume discount rate practices. These actions
stem from the Commission's voluminous Report on Network Broadcasting,
issued in 1957.250 One of the recommendations of the Report was that the
networks be prohibited from representing stations other than their own in
national spot sales. 251 The study found "the national spot field ... is in direct
competition with network television for the business of national advertisers"
and that there was evidence of cooperation between network national spot sales
units and networks "to equalize national spot and network rates [by] restrain-
ing competition between [them ]."252 The first direct result of the Report was
an amendment to Section 3.658.of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations 26 to
prohibit arrangements under which networks represented their affiliates in the
sale of non-network time. The Commission concluded that such representations,
first, gave the networks power to restrain competition for positions as national
spot representatives, since they could influence the decisions of their affiliates
and, second, tended to restrict competition between network and non-network
time sales, since the networks would tend to manipulate national spot sales
and rates to advance their conflicting interests as networks. These considera-
247. Supra note 238.
248. Supra note 239.
249. The Commission, however, in 1944 reinstated Regulation 3.107, which is a more
indirect control of a network business policy, and it has been in effect without challenge
since. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.137 (1965).
250. NETwORK BROADCASTING, supra note 15.
251. Id. at 648-49.
252. Id. at 649.
253. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1965).
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tions also impinged upon the independence of station licensees.2" This pro-
ceeding is directly relevant to the possibility of FCC action against volume
discount rate structures because, first, it recognizes that encouraging competi-
tion between network time and station national spot sales is a reason for
Commission intervention and, second, it sanctions direct intervention against
network "business policies" on that ground alone. A volume discount structure
so designed that advertisers interested in prime network time find it disadvan-
tageous to order day time or time in a fringe period from the stations on their
national spot representations seems to have similar anticompetitive effects.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC,25r- upholding the Commission's power
to regulate the networks' spot time sales activities, indicates that the Com-
mission does not interpret its authority in this area too broadly. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners' contention that the amendment was invalid be-
cause it was based on a merely "potential" restraint rather than a violation of
the antitrust laws. 6 Moreover, the decision upheld an "indirect" use of station
licensing standards to force networks to carry out an "internal" change in a
situation which was not in any way reflected in its affiliation agreements. T7
The change thus brought about was one of the most drastic known to the law
of remedies, "divestiture" of otherwise perfectly usual contract and property
rights. The basis for the Commission action was not "unreasonable," and
therefore the order was upheld.
After receiving an opinion from the Department of Justice m that "option
time," as previously limited by its Regulation 3.104, was in violation of the
Sherman Act either as an "exclusive dealing" or a "tying" arrangement, the
Commission reversed an earlier ruling and concluded that it was not essential
to network operations.259 It found option time provisions to have anticompeti-
tive effects on four levels of the television industry: (1) Independent producers
of programs were foreclosed from marketing their products to affiliated stations
for use during option time periods. (2) Non-network advertisers unable to
afford or use the full network were foreclosed from prime evening time on net-
work affiliates. (3) Independent stations suffered from a lack of quality film
from independent producers because there were not enough independent sta-
tions to support their productions. (4) National spot sales representatives
could not offer station time on network affiliates to national advertisers want-
ing a selective market campaign.
254. Network Representation of Stations in National Spot Sales, 27 FCC 697 (1959),
reconsideration denied, 28 FCC 447 (1960), aff'd sb non. Metropolitan Television Co.
v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
255. 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
256. Id. at 876.
257. Ibid.
258. See reference to the opinion in Option Time, 34 FCC 1103, 1107 (1963).
259. Option Time, 34 FCC 1103, 1132 (1963).
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The Commission noted:
One of the recent developments .. is the drastic decline in the output
of new, first-run syndicated film programming. In 1956, 28 or 29 new
first-run film series were offered; in 1961-62 there were no more than 7
or 8. Ziv-UA and other opponents ascribe this to network policies and
practices - not only the restriction on access to desirable time arising
from the option time practice, but also the effect of increased network
programming during nonoption hours . . . and, in particular, the trend
toward hour-long network shows in evening hours.
2 60
The Commission also noted the effect on competition between advertisers:
At the same time, the non-network advertiser - who in many cases
(such as regional baking companies, etc.) may be able to afford the same
prime time and quality programming with respect to the markets he is
interested in, as his national, network-advertising competitor - is denied
access to prime time and is thus at a competitive disadvantage. There are
of course other forms of advertising available to him, such as spot an-
nouncements on individual stations, or even (especially with the increas-
ing number of "participating" network shows) network time. But the
number of "spots" available in prime time on individual stations is of
course limited, and it may not be economically feasible or desirable for
him to use network "spot" time, if he is interested in only relatively few
markets. Thus, denied equal access to individual station time, he is likely
to be at a disadvantage, at least in some cases, as compared to his na-
tional competitor.
20 1
A footnote to the opinion points out that there are only 20 VHF stations in 14
major markets which are not affiliated. If the independents are too small in
number to support their own programming they must resort to inferior net-
work reruns.
26 2
The Commission noted that if an affiliate refuses to clear a particular pro-
gram the network can seek another station in the same market to act as an
outlet; or the advertiser may accept the line-up of stations without the market,
or another advertiser may be found. The key markets, the Commission notes,
are always open to the networks; each network owns stations which guarantee
access to 25 per cent of all television homes. 2 3 Finally, the Commission noted
that not only option time, but any device having a like restraining effect, is
contrary to the public interest and should be prohibited.
2 0 4
The rationale of this decision is particularly relevant to the network volume
discount problem because it recognizes that Commission regulation may be
based not only on protection of the interests of station licensees, but also those
of the independent program producers, national spot representatives and non-
network advertisers necessary to the existence of effective competition with
network television. In particular, the Commission's willingness to look outside
the industry itself to consider effects on its "clientele," the advertisers, estab-
260. Id. at 1114.
261. Id. at 1116.
262. Ibid.
263. Id. at 1125.
264. Id. at 1132.
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lished an important precedent directly related to the situation under examina-
tion here.265
CBS sought to avoid the effect of the option time prohibition by a provision
in its affiliation agreements basing the amount of compensation paid to a station
for each program on the number of network programs the station cleared dur-
ing a specified period. Stations clearing substantially all network programs
were to receive 60 per cent of the network rate while those clearing a small
number of hours received as little as 10 per cent of the rate. In the first pro-
ceeding by the Commission against the "sliding scale" compensation plan the
networks argued that the Commission was in effect attempting to fix their
rates; they read the NBC case as prohibiting "rate-making."2 0 The Commis-
sion said:
We believe that the CBS contention lacks substantial merit, since en-
forcement of a rule which has been sustained by the courts by an opinion
with respect to the compliance of a particular agreement with that rule,
is not the same thing as fixing or approving rates. It might just as well
be argued that enforcement of the Sherman Act is a regulation of prices,
a contention which has never been accepted by the courts.20 7
The Commission also noted the "tie-in" aspect of the plans:
Because of the 'tie-in' features of the plan, it also appears that the plan
will work against stations developing and broadcasting local live program-
ming as an alternative to network offerings.
-20 8
A very recent action also confirms the Commission's view that network
practices having anticompetitive effects at several levels within and outside the
industry fall within its jurisdiction. In addition, the action involves a network
practice not directly related to the contract between a network and its affiliates.
The action involves the Commission's request for comment on a proposed
regulation to limit network control of programming. - 9 After extensive hear-
ings the Office of Network Study concluded that the networks were coming to
dominate program production by acquiring an interest in most of the independ-
ently produced television programs.270 It observed that the networks
through these activities, place themselves in a situation where very
compelling economic motives arise to choose for network exhibition and
265. The Commission's willingness to look at competitive problems outside the broad-
cast industry is underlined by its inquiry into the relationships between broadcast licensees
and newswire services. On the complaint of licensees, the Commission has begun a study
of the contractual terms demanded by newswire services, particularly the requirement
that the contract run for a five year term. One of the stated objectives of the study is
to "determine the effect of long term contracts with broadcasters on competition between
newswire services and the development of other news sources, and the nature of the
resulting detriment to the public interest embodied in the Communications Act!" See Con-
tracts of Broadcast Licensees with Newswire Services, 1 P.&F.R. 53 :xi (FCC 1964).
266. CBS Network Compensation Plan, 24 P.&F.R.R. 513, 514 (FCC 1962).
267. Ibid.
268. Id. at 519.
269. Supra note 86.
270. H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1963).
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thus to popularize those film series in which they have been able to acquire
a right to share in continuing values from syndication and other values
which may be created or enhanced through network exhibition.271
When the report was sent to the Commission on November 28, 1962, the
letter of submittal said:
This report .. concludes that the policies and practices of the net-
works in program procurement unduly restrict and restrain the conpeti-
tive development of the market for independently produced network tele-
vision programs.
272
Should the proposed regulation be adopted, the Commission will again have
intervened in an internal network business policy not directly related to the
terms of affiliation agreements.
273
Most of the problems which were discussed in the Report on Network
Broadcasting are analytically related in some degree to network volume dis-
counts. Yet the report did not consider the effects of network discounts and no
recommendations about them were forthcoming. Instead the Commission has
moved step by step to eliminate practices thought to be the cause of each prob-
lem the study presented. It outlawed option time, took the networks out of the
spot sales business, prohibited sliding scale compensation, and supported legis-
lation designed to encourage the use of UHF. It is now moving towards re-
ducing network control of programming.
Despite the Commission's action the problems of network broadcasting in
1965 are largely the same as they were in 1955, and to some extent the situa-
tion has deteriorated. Affiliates still clear most network programs, UHF tele-
vision is still largely undeveloped, independent program producers are still
suffering, and independent "advertiser created networks" have not appeared
to any significant degree.27 4 In addition, we are becoming aware that the in-
271. Id. at 103.
272. Id. at 11.
273. Another pending effort to regulate network policy indirectly grew out of the
quiz program scandal. Proposed rules requiring an announcement of the nature and extent
of coaching to which participants have been subjected would operate primarily against
the networks and the program producers. See Quiz Programs - Proposed Rules, 1 P.&
F.R.R. 53:ix (FCC 1960). For another example of FCC indirect regulation of non-
licensees, see Proposed Amendments, 1 P.&F.R.R. 52:1xxi (FCC 1964).
274. The Dumont Television Network ceased operation in 1954. Since that time
attempts to enter the network business have been limited to special network arrangements
such as the Sports Network, and film syndication "networks" such as National Telefilm
Associates. The failure of a new network to enter is in spite of the presence of numerous
"multiple owners" who might be in an excellent position to attempt entry. Such large
multiple owners as Storer Broadcasting and Westinghouse own five television stations
in major markets which might serve as a nucleus for a new network. See generally,
NETwoRx BROADCASTING 170-207. Recently, however, there have been discussions exploring
the viability of creating a fourth television network. It is not at all clear whether the
promoters have considered the obstacles to the success of such a venture posed by the
current network rate policies. See Doan, A Fourth TV Network: - Maybe, New York
Herald Tribune, May 12, 1965, p. 23, col. 3.
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dustry's rate practices may'be having an unhealthy effect on other parts of the
economy, particularly through mergers.
The foregoing Commission decisions suggest that, although it has steered
very clear of directly or indirectly setting or even influencing the level of net-
work advertising rates, as such, it has clear authority and precedent for action
against a rate structure which has important anticompetitive effects. Were the
Commission to investigate the problem of volume discounts and find as a mat-
ter-of fact that the ills of network television are in part a result of those dis-
counts, an appropriate regulation controlling them would be sustained by the
courts. Commission action policing the network rate structure against discrimi-
nation in an effort to improve competition in the broadcast industry would be
a move away from -"common carrier" type of regulation and toward the original
policy notions of the Communications Act discussed by the Court in Sanders.
As long as the discriminatory network rate structure continues, it will be diffi-
cult to argue that competition has been given a fair chance to operate as the
basic regulatory instrument of the broadcast industry.
The Commission has previously taken into account only in a very limited
degree the effect of network practices on the health of competition in the
broader markets in which advertisers compete. However, the Act's objective
of controlling the use of the radio spectrum in the public interest and the
courts' broad interpretation of Commission authority to consider anticompeti-
tive effects in this regard, suggest that this basis for remedial action, too, is
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
What would the effect be on network television if its present discount struc-
ture were outlawed as anticompetitive by action of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission or one of the antitrust enforcement agencies? First, it seems
almost certain that any such action would be sustained in the courts. Indeed,
those agencies may be open to some criticism for permitting such important
and obviously questionable practices to remain so long unchallenged. But per-
haps the full scope of the anticompetitive effects has only recently become ap-
parent. Second, an answer to the economic question of what would happen to
the structure of the television industry is more difficult. In part, the answer
would depend on the scope and substance of the corrective measures which
result from the ultimate Commission order or court decree. The forces of com-
petition tend to order new arrangements largely through businessmen's trial
and error. However, there would be a strong tendency for prime evening time
rates to move substantially higher, and for day and summer time rates to move
lower. Advertisers would tend to move parts of their activity more freely from
network to network, and to and from other media, "diversifying" to a greater
extent. Smaller firms which do not now find it feasible to use network tele-
vision might be encouraged to use the less expensive day and summer time
hours. Evening network television would probably lose some marginal users,
at least until new station and network entry restored lower prime time rates.
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There would be a tendency for networks and affiliates to downgrade their
activity in those hours during which viewers are scarce, perhaps discontinuing
some of it entirely, if FCC regulations and other factors permit. On the other
hand, the higher prices for evening time would - if the obligation to operate
when there are few viewers is sufficiently flexible - result in a better profit
picture, which would create a substantial tendency for new channels to be
developed, especially in UHF and in marginal areas. There would then be
an economic stimulus for new networks or network-type arrangements, and
new independent program producers, to come into existence to serve the new
stations. These developments would provide existing affiliates with more alter-
natives in programming independently or through multiple affiliations. The
new service facilities would also find entry less difficult because of the greater
freedom of advertisers to experiment with their wares.
The networks may argue, as they have done in opposing past FCC actions,
that the anticipated economic results are inconsistent with the continued exist-
ence of the present system of network television. This kind of assertion is
difficult to disprove, but we may note that insofar as business organizations
perform valued social functions, they tend to be highly adaptive to a changing
legal milieu. The Commission's previous "restructuring" actions have not no-
ticeably diminished the networks' ability to survive as profitable enterprises.
Further, virtually all U.S. manufacturers and producers of goods manage to
live with law which requires nondiscriminatory pricing in most situations.
Nonetheless, perhaps it is the case that television networks are less viable than
other businesses, and we should listen to the facts they care to adduce. Such
information would clearly be relevant to the Federal Communications Com-
mission in a rule-making proceeding. In an antitrust action, the Federal Trade
Commission or court might find such information useful in framing a remedy,
although economic "justifications" do not provide a substantive defense where
anticompetitive effects are present. The expert knowledge of the Federal Com-
munications Commission in these matters suggests that it might be the appro-
priate agency to evaluate such arguments.
In this connection, a comprehensive study of the socially useful economic
functions performed by television networks would be helpful. This is a subject
about which there is little public understanding and less than one would ex-
pect even in the specialized literature. One of the networks' important social
contributions is the additional independent news services which they maintain
and the system of station interconnection which they support. This system
makes possible rapid dissemination of news and public affairs information as
well as "live" coverage of important political, social and sporting events. Net-
works are also uniquely able to present "live" material of other types, such as
entertainment programming, but very little of this now takes place; most en-
tertainment programs are on film or videotape. It may be argued that net-
works also perform socially useful functions (1) in acting for many stations
as a sales agent, which to some extent may simplify advertising agency work
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in dealing with numerous national representatives (2) as a risk-taking entre-
preneur in bringing together advertiser, program ideas and station time, and
(3) in providing programming better than a competitive market would make
available to marginal stations and in marginal times.
But none of these arguments can be given decisive weight without careful
evaluation of the social costs involved in the system and the possibility that
alternative systems would function more efficiently. Nor is it at all clear, tor
example, that network discretion should be substituted for decisions of the
market with respect to allocation of income among stations and, through
channeling advertising dollars, programming resources among broadcast time
periods. Most important, if the present system of network broadcasting ncccs-
sarily operates to injure competition in the markets in which advertisers
operate, by discriminating in favor of size and encouraging mergers, perhaps
there are alternative arrangements which do not.Y5 These are questions as to
which the most careful and imaginative industry and economic studies should
be directed at once by the Federal Communications Commission. The most
desirable form of relief in a proceeding against the television networks might
depend also on questions regarding the legality of similar discriminatory rate
structures in other advertising media. This would seem to argue in favor of
parallel, co-ordinated study and action by the Federal Trade Commission.
In any event, relief for the economy is overdue, and its delay cannot fairly
be attributed to any inadequacies which may exist in the applicable laws.
275. It is the network role as "sales agent" for station time - not its role as supplier
of programming - which is primarily involved in the anti-competitive effects we have
discussed. It is at least theoretically possible that these roles could be separated. For
example, Associated Press and United Press International supply news and features to
newspapers without acting as a sales agent for their advertising space. Performing a
comparable function, networks, instead of competing with each other to win advertisers,
would compete for the custom of individual stations as members, subscribers or purchasers
of program material. This would give stations more freedom with respect to programming,
with which responsibility they are charged by law. It would also make the "ratings race"
a localized affair, based on the nature and tastes of a particular community, arguably
having less of a "lowest common denominator" effect.
We are not arguing in favor of transforming networks into station service organiza-
tions, but suggesting that the present system is not the only one which could perform the
social functions that are desired, nor even necessarily the best, even apart from the legal
problems it entails.
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